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THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION AND STRUCTURAL REFORM
OF THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE
MARGO SCHLANGER
PAULINE KIM
INTRODUCTION
In one of its most-watched recent cases, the United States Supreme
Court struck down a class action alleging that Wal-Mart stores
discriminated against female employees in pay and promotion decisions.1
The plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart’s corporate culture and highly
discretionary decision-making practices led to sex discrimination on a
company-wide basis, and they sought injunctive relief as well as backpay
for individual employees. Reversing the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, the Supreme Court held in Wal-Mart v. Dukes that the proposed
class failed to meet the requirements for class action certification under
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 Although the decision
 Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
 Charles Nagel Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis.
This paper uses data collected as part of a larger project, the EEOC Litigation Project (Principal
Investigators Pauline Kim, Margo Schlanger, and Andrew Martin), data available at
http://eeoclitigation.wustl.edu/. Christina Boyd and Morgan Hazelton provided countless hours of
critical assistance with the process of data collection, cleaning, and shaping, as well as generous help
on this paper. The larger data project received generous support from the Center for Empirical
Research in the Law at Washington University School of Law and from the National Science
Foundation, SES-0718831 (“The Litigation Process in Government Initiated Discrimination Suits”). In
addition, University of Michigan Law School library staff was outstandingly helpful (and spent untold
hours) in chasing down many unpublished sources. Our thanks as well to Grady Bridges, Alex
Colbert-Taylor, and Jennifer Gitter for their data-management and research assistance; to Laura Beth
Nielsen and Bob Nelson for sharing data with us; to participants at law faculty workshops at Stanford,
UCLA, Duke, Washington University, and the University of Arizona, at the Labor Law Research
Network, the Labor & Employment Law Colloquium, and the Jack Pemberton Legacy Event,
University of San Francisco Law School; and to Sam Bagenstos, Frank Dobbin, Tristin Green,
Alexandra Kalev, J.J. Prescott, and Michael Selmi for comments on drafts.
1. Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
2. More specifically, a majority of the Court found that the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the
Rule 23(a)(2) requirement of showing that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class”
because they had not identified a companywide discriminatory policy. Id. at 2556. The four dissenters
would have upheld the district court’s determination that the proposed class met the commonality
requirement, finding a common dispute as to whether Wal-Mart’s discretionary pay and promotion
policies produced discriminatory outcomes. Id. at 2566 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). All nine justices
unanimously agreed that because the plaintiffs sought individual monetary relief in addition to classwide injunctive relief, the class should not have been certified under Rule 23(b)(2); cases in which the
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was widely understood as raising the bar for all types of class actions, it
had particular significance for employment discrimination litigation.
Observers wondered if it signaled the end of large-scale employment
litigation aimed at structural reform of the workplace, or an implicit
rejection of more expansive theories of employer liability under Title VII. 3
While class litigation has continued in the wake of Wal-Mart, the
opinion clearly has made it more difficult to obtain certification of private
employment discrimination class actions.4 As a result, the role of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in seeking
structural reform of the workplace has gained comparative importance.
Unlike private litigants, the EEOC need not comply with the requirements
of Rule 23 when it brings suit on behalf of a group of aggrieved
individuals.5 Instead, the EEOC possesses express statutory authority to
sue in its own name to vindicate the public interest in preventing
employment discrimination and to seek relief for a group of employees. 6
The EEOC’s reports have stressed its “unique role and responsibility in
combating systemic discrimination” and emphasized the importance of

monetary relief is not incidental to injunctive or declaratory relief should proceed as 23(b)(3) class
actions, if at all. Id. at 2561; id. at 2558 (majority opinion).
3. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 395 (2011) [hereinafter Green, Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law];
Melissa Hart, Civil Rights and Systemic Wrongs, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 455 (2011)
[hereinafter Hart, Civil Rights]; John M. Husband & Bradford J. Williams, Wal-Mart v. Dukes Redux:
The Future of the Sprawling Class Action, 40 COLO. LAW. 53 (2011); Suzette M. Malveaux, How
Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34
(2011); Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law: After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 477 (2011); Noah D. Zatz, Introduction: Working Group on the Future
of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 387 (2011) [hereinafter Zatz,
Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment]; Sherry E. Clegg, Note, Employment Discrimination Class
Actions: Why Plaintiffs Must Cover All Their Bases After the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1087 (2012).
4. Although a number of proposed class actions have failed to be certified following Wal-Mart,
see, e.g., Davis v. Cintas Corp., 717 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. 2013) (denying certification of proposed
nationwide sex discrimination class action); Bell v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 08-6292
(RBK/AMD), 2011 WL 6256978 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2011); (denying class certification); Stockwell v.
City and Cnty. of San Francisco, No. C 08-5180 PJH, 2011 WL 4803505 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2011)
(same), in other cases, courts have granted certification where the facts were distinguishable from WalMart. See, e.g., McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir.
2012) (certifying class action in race discrimination case); Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co, 877
F. Supp.2d 113 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting class certification); Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 285
F.R.D. 492 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (certifying class action).
5. Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 323 (1980).
6. See id. at 331.
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these cases to its mission.7 The agency has other advantages in pursuing
multi-employee cases: its public funding allows it to pursue cases in which
monetary damages are low or difficult to prove, and its history, regulatory
role, and nationwide reach give it resources unavailable to private counsel.
In the wake of Wal-Mart, observers anticipate that the agency will or
should play a larger role in bringing systemic cases in the future.8 And the
EEOC has recently recommitted to strengthening its focus on such cases.9
Given the obstacles to private class actions created by Wal-Mart and the
EEOC’s unique powers to enforce Title VII, the agency’s efforts to seek
structural reform of workplaces warrant close study. Yet, the recent
literature has largely overlooked the role of the EEOC in pursuing
structural reform in the workplace.
Early theories of “structural reform” or “public law litigation”—cases
that try “to give meaning to [legal] values in the operation of large-scale
organizations”10—developed in the years after Title VII was passed, and
emphasized dramatic legal struggles to transform recalcitrant institutions.11
Although many of the examples cited involved suits against public entities
such as hospitals, prisons, jails, and schools, a number of scholars
concurred that large-scale employment discrimination cases fit the public
law litigation model.12 Scholars like Owen Fiss and Abram Chayes, along

7. EEOC, SYSTEMIC TASK FORCE REPORT 2 (2006), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
task_reports/upload/systemic.pdf [hereinafter EEOC, SYSTEMIC REPORT].
8. See, e.g., Lydell C. Bridgeford, EEOC’s Systemic Program Set to Fill Gap in Private Class
Actions, Attorneys Predict, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 244, Dec. 19, 2012, at A-5; Zatz, Future of
Systemic Disparate Treatment, supra note 3, at 394 (anticipating the EEOC and Department of Justice
might bring next wave of systemic disparate treatment cases). See also Hart, Civil Rights, supra note 3,
at 475 (suggesting a greater reliance on EEOC enforcement efforts to address systemic discrimination
after Wal-Mart); Angela D. Morrison, Duke-ing Out Pattern or Practice after Wal-Mart: The EEOC
as Fist, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 87 (2013) (arguing for the EEOC to take on a greater role in pursuing
pattern or practice cases after Dukes).
9. See EEOC, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012–2016, available at http://www.eeoc.
gov/eeoc/plan/upload/strategic_plan_12to16.pdf; EEOC, SYSTEMIC REPORT, supra note 7.
10. Owen Fiss, Foreword, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1979) [hereinafter Fiss,
Forms of Justice]; see also OWEN FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 86–95 (1978) [hereinafter FISS,
CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION]. As Fiss explained, “[s]tructural reform is premised on the notion that the
quality of our social life is affected in important ways by the operation of large-scale organizations, not
just by individuals acting either beyond or within these organizations.” Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra,
at 2.
11. See generally, e.g., Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 10, at 27–28; Abram Chayes, The Role
of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1298–1302 (1976) [hereinafter Chayes,
Public Law Litigation].
12. See, e.g., Robert Belton, A Comparative Review of Public and Private Enforcement of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 VAND. L. REV. 905, 919 (1978) (asserting that Title VII class
actions have the characteristics of public law litigation); Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 11,
at 1284 (listing employment discrimination cases as one of the “avatars” of public law litigation);
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with a crowd of other observers,13 depicted mammoth cases that provide
the occasion for heroic (or imperial14) judging or advocacy. Of central
importance to these cases was the remedial phase, “a long continuous
relationship between the judge and the institution.”15 As Chayes argued,
the decree in public law cases typically “provid[ed] for a complex, ongoing regime of performance [that] prolongs and deepens, rather than
terminates, the court’s involvement with the dispute.”16 Thus, the literature
described cases that lasted for years, even decades, and cost millions of
dollars to litigate, that posed acute challenges to the managerial capacity of
courts and offer occasions for power grabs by plaintiffs. Both those who
have praised and those who have condemned structural reform litigation
have concurred in this general description, which we call the “gladiator
theory” of structural reform litigation.
In subsequent years, theorists of structural reform litigation began to
explore more collaborative models of reform. Charles Sabel and William
Simon wrote in 2004 that the litigation has moved away from remedial
intervention modeled on command-and-control bureaucracy “toward a
kind of intervention that can be called ‘experimentalist,’” which
“emphasizes ongoing stakeholder negotiation, continuously revised
performance measures, and transparency.”17 Other scholars have seen a
similar approach in the workplace context, describing what they term a
“structural approach” to solving problems of discriminatory bias.18 They

Maimon Schwarzchild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of
Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE L.J. 887, 893 [hereinafter Schwarzchild, Public Law by
Private Bargain] (asserting that “Title VII litigation [is] a formidable example of ‘public law’”).
13. For an extensive guide to the literature, see Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over
Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 569 n.71 (2006)
[hereinafter Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time]; Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero
Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation as Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994, 1995–97 & nn.10–15
(1999).
14. See, e.g., Nathan Glazer, Towards an Imperial Judiciary?, 41 PUB. INT. 104 (1975).
15. Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 10, at 27.
16. Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 11, at 1298.
17. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1016 (2004) (abstract) [hereinafter Sabel & Simon,
Destabilization Rights].
18. See generally Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001) [hereinafter Sturm, Second Generation]; Tristin K. Green,
Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory,
38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91 (2003) [hereinafter Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics]. In
their view, the “easy” first generation cases of blatant discrimination are largely gone; discriminatory
bias in employment today is more subtle and difficult to detect, yet the structure of the contemporary
workplace renders it nonetheless extremely potent. Sturm, Second Generation, at 468–74; Green,
Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, at 95–108. Effective workplace reform efforts therefore

http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss6/7

2014]

STRUCTURAL REFORM OF THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE

1523

point to some high profile cases as embodying this approach—relying on
flexible, context-specific remedies to create “processes of accountability”
and encourage experimentation and information-sharing.19 We refer to this
vision of civil rights injunctive litigation as the “collaboration theory.”
The collaboration theory has in turn come under criticism, as unduly
empowering employers and human resources professionals to devise
compliance strategies.20 Because the requirements of the antidiscrimination norm are ambiguous, employers can influence how those
norms are operationalized, and their practices in turn shape the meaning of
those norms. Law, in other words, is endogenous to its own
implementation.21 Organizational sociologists like Lauren Edelman, Frank
Dobbin, and others have found that employers frequently respond to the
requirements of anti-discrimination laws in ways that signal compliance
with the law while accommodating the organization’s managerial
interests.22 Managers have come to embrace the advice of personnel
professionals who have long advocated a set of standardized bureaucratic
responses, such as creating anti-discrimination policies, conducting EEO
trainings, and establishing grievance procedures. These responses diffused
through professional networks and were eventually validated by court
decisions endorsing them as liability-defeating compliance.
The literature just summarized describing structural reform of the
workplace suffers from several limitations. First, to the extent that it
describes systemic litigation, it has relied on a handful of mega cases that
are not necessarily representative.23 In the 1970s, a prime example was the

require not battles, but collaborations. Sturm, Second Generation, at 475–78; Green, Discrimination in
Workplace Dynamics, at 144.
19. Susan Sturm, Equality and the Forms of Justice, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 51, 80 (2003); Sturm,
Second Generation, supra note 18, at 542.
20. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination
Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 25–34 (2006) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Structural Turn]; Tristin K. Green,
Targeting Workplace Context: Title VII as a Tool for Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 659
705–06 (2003) [hereinafter Green, Targeting Workplace Context].
21. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman, Christopher Uggen, & Howard S. Erlanger, The Endogeneity
of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 406, 409 (1999)
[hereinafter Edelman et al., Endogeneity of Legal Regulation].
22. See, e.g., FRANK DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 220–33 (2009); Lauren B.
Edelman, Sally Riggs Fuller, & Iona Mara-Drita, Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of
Law, 106 AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 1589, 1592 (2001) [hereinafter Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric];
Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil
Rights Law, 97 AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 1531, 1542 (1992) [hereinafter Edelman, Legal Ambiguity].
23. Similarly, in discussing prison and jail injunctive litigation, one of us has written that “our
knowledge about a few cases is deep but highly unreliable more generally because those few are so
aberrational.” Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time, supra note 13, at 571.
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litigation against AT&T.24 More recently, analysis has featured suits
against Shoney’s,25 Home Depot,26 Wal-Mart,27 Coca-Cola,28 and
Texaco.29 Observers disagree on how to interpret these high-profile
cases,30 but perhaps the greater problem lies in taking them as
representative of broader trends. These cases constitute just a sliver of a
larger docket of cases aimed at providing relief to a group or class of
employees31—cases that have gone largely unexamined. Second, the

24. EEOC v. AT&T, 365 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (documents and information available at
UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH., THE CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE [hereinafter CIVIL
RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE], http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11146). See, e.g.,
HERBERT R. NORTHRUP & JOHN A. LARSON, THE IMPACT OF THE AT&T-EEO CONSENT DECREE
(1979); MARJORIE A. STOCKFORD, THE BELLWOMEN: THE STORY OF THE LANDMARK AT&T SEX
DISCRIMINATION CASE (2004).
25. Haynes v. Shoney’s, No. 3:89-cv-30093, 1993 WL 19915 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 1993)
(documents and information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=10711). See, e.g., Nancy Levit, Megacases, Diversity, and
the Elusive Goal of Workplace Reform, 49 B.C. L. REV. 367 (2008) [hereinafter Levit, Megacases].
26. Butler v. Home Depot, No. 3:94-cv-04335 (N.D. Cal., filed Dec. 19, 1994) (documents and
information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/
detail.php?id=9471). See, e.g., Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18; Levit, Megacases, supra
note 25; Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment
Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249 (2003) [hereinafter Selmi, Price of
Discrimination]; Lynn Perry Wooten & Erika Hayes James, When Firms Fail to Learn: The
Perpetuation of Discrimination in the Workplace, 13 MGMT. INQUIRY 23 (2004).
27. Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (documents and information available at CIVIL
RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=10697). See, e.g.,
LIZA FEATHERSTONE, SELLING WOMEN SHORT: THE LANDMARK BATTLE FOR WORKERS’ RIGHTS AT
WAL-MART (2004).
28. Ingram v. Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.R.D. 685 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (documents and information
available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.
php?id=9473). See, e.g., Levit, Megacases, supra note 25; Henry Unger, Discrimination Lawsuit
Coca-Cola Accused of “Company-wide Pattern,” ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 24, 1999, at H1.
29. Roberts v. Texaco, Inc., 979 F.Supp. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (for documents and information,
see CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id= 8162).
See, e.g., CATHY CRONIN-HARRIS & DAVID M. WHITE, NEGOTIATING ENDURING CORPORATE
CHANGE: A CASE STUDY ON THE TASK FORCE ON EQUALITY AND FAIRNESS IN ROBERTS V. TEXACO
INC. (2005), available at http://www.dmwlawfirm.com/resources/Texaco%20Case% 20Study.pdf;
Levit, Megacases, supra note 25; Selmi, Price of Discriminaton, supra note 26.
30. Selmi and Sturm disagree, for example, on nearly everything important about the Home
Depot case. Compare Selmi, Price of Discrimination, supra note 26, at 1281–89 (characterizing Home
Depot’s response to class litigation as an example of recalcitrance), with Sturm, Second Generation,
supra note 18, at 509–19 (describing consent decree reached in Home Depot litigation as an innovative
solution).
31. Employment discrimination suits were and remain one of the largest components of federal
court civil litigation. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD
STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2006, 2006 tbl. C-2A (2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2006/appendices/c2a.pdf; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2012, 2012 TBL. C-2A (2012), available at http://www.
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almost exclusive focus of the recent literature has been on cases brought
by private counsel, with little or no attention paid to the enforcement
efforts of the EEOC or the role that might be played by the agency in
seeking structural reforms.32 Finally, the sociological literature, while
attentive to firms’ responses to the general legal environment, has largely
neglected the role of the EEOC in that process in recent years.
In this Article, we begin to fill these gaps by systematically analyzing
the EEOC’s litigation activities and the injunctive relief it obtained in
cases brought over a ten-year period, from fiscal years 1997 to 2006.33 Our
focus is on the most “class-like” of the EEOC’s cases—those most likely
aiming at structural reform of the workplace—which we examine in light
of the existing literature. We find that neither the early description of
public law litigation, the gladiator theory, nor more recent, experimentalist
accounts of institutional reform, the collaboration theory, depicts the
reality of the EEOC’s practices in systemic cases. Unlike the depiction of
structural reform litigation in the gladiator theory, the EEOC’s litigation is
fairly modest; the cases are not bet-the-company battles and the awards are
for thousands or occasionally millions of dollars, but not tens or hundreds
of millions. The remedial phases last several years, not decades, and the
dockets show few signs of post-decretal struggle. The cases are, it seems,
only occasionally highly contentious; few epic battles appear. Most often
no heated contestation of anti-discrimination norms takes place; the cases
nearly always end with settlements rather than litigated judgments, and
most of those settlements are negotiated without significant judicial
intervention. Nor do the decrees require wholesale change to company
practices, but rather more modest changes—in particular, the
rationalization of hiring, promotion, and complaint investigation
processes. In short, these are ordinary, moderate-size litigations, not
dramatic struggles.
At the same time, there is little sign of the type of flexible,
contextualized, and decentralized problem-solving processes that the
collaboration theorists envision. The EEOC’s decrees are not obviously
individualized or contextual; most of their terms recur across cases.

uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/appendices/C02ASep12.pdf. The vast majority
of employment discrimination suits are brought by private counsel.
32. For example, Susan Sturm and Michael Selmi make only brief mention of the EEOC in their
studies of large-scale employment discrimination cases. See, e.g., Selmi, Price of Discrimination,
supra note 26, at 1330–31; Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18, at 550–53.
33. For the EEOC, as for the federal government as a whole, a fiscal year begins on October 1 of
the previous year and runs through September 30 of the year which it is numbered.

Washington University Open Scholarship

1526

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 91:1519

Moreover, only rarely do the decrees appear to require actions that are
significantly integrated with an employer’s core operations. It is, of
course, possible that the terms of these consent decrees do not capture the
collaborative nature of the problem solving they frame. By definition, a
collaborative approach to structural reform will not entail clearly
articulated rules or goals. Rather, one might look for evidence that a
decree sets up a process that encourages and facilitates creative,
accountable, and effective problem solving. Our data, however, contain
little such evidence. The EEOC’s consent decrees generally repeat the
same handful of requirements regarding matters like notice posting,
training, and complaint processing. While a significant minority of the
decrees empower specified actors—human resources managers or
consultants—to report to management and oversee implementation, very
few decrees appear to put into place any mechanisms to create benchmarks
by which employers might be held accountable or to encourage ongoing
dialogue and norm creation with interested stakeholders. And virtually
none of the consent decrees we examined appear to give ordinary
employees any meaningful voice in the process of articulating and
implementing anti-discrimination norms apart from the ability to file
individual complaints.
If the gladiator and collaboration theories do not accurately describe
the EEOC’s injunctive litigation, how best can it be understood? Even in
those cases we identify as systemic, the remedies obtained by the EEOC
are geared more towards rationalizing the firm’s employment practices
than transforming its culture and norms. They impose practices that would
be entirely familiar to firms with well-functioning human resources
departments that have adopted professionally endorsed “best practices” for
compliance with the law. The adoption of these forms of injunctive relief
is consonant with the sociological literature on how firms respond in nonlitigation contexts to anti-discrimination law. Thus, we argue that the
EEOC’s structural reform efforts are best viewed not as intense battles
seeking to transform the heart and soul of complex organizations, nor as
equally intense and equally transformative partnerships, but as the quite
routinized application of managerialist, bureaucratic responses to the legal
prohibitions against discrimination.
Our argument unfolds as follows: We begin in Part I by surveying the
literature on structural reform litigation and on the organizational
responses to anti-discrimination law. In Part II, we describe the EEOC’s
role as a structural reform plaintiff. Part III presents three case studies as
examples of the EEOC’s systemic litigation, detailing the types of
injunctive relief obtained. Part IV more systematically explores the
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injunctive relief obtained in the EEOC’s systemic litigation over a ten-year
period. It describes our methodology, sets out some basic information
about the agency’s systemic docket, and then examines this evidence in
light of the theoretical literature.34 We conclude that the EEOC’s
injunctive practices are best understood as pursuing standard, bureaucratic
personnel practices that have helped to promote and ratify the
managerialist responses adopted by many organizations. We finish by
briefly assessing the EEOC’s efforts to address systemic discrimination in
the Conclusion.
I. THE PRIOR LITERATURE
In this Part, we review the literatures regarding structural reform
litigation and the impact of anti-discrimination norms in the workplace.
A. The Gladiator Theory
The early scholarship on the topic magnified the image of structural
reform litigation, giving the impression that civil rights injunctive cases
are almost invariably the sites of long- and hard-fought struggles for
justice. In Against Settlement, in 1984, Owen Fiss described cases in
which courts “seek to safeguard public values by restructuring large-scale
bureaucratic organizations” in dramatic terms: “the task is enormous, and
our knowledge of how to restructure on-going bureaucratic organizations
is limited. As a consequence, courts must oversee and manage the
remedial process for a long time—maybe forever.”35 In his view, ongoing
disputes and judicial involvement were “inevitable,” even in cases that
settle:
The parties may be ignorant of the difficulties ahead or optimistic
about the future, or they may simply believe that they can get more
favorable terms through a bargained-for agreement. Soon, however,
the inevitable happens: One party returns to court and asks the judge

34. All data and replication code are posted online. See http://margoschlanger.net; & http://eeoc
litigation.wustl.edu/. The Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse archives relevant case documents and
other information. See CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, available at http://www.clearing
house.net/results.php?searchSpecial Collection=1.
35. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1083 (1984).
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to modify the decree, either to make it more effective or less
stringent.36
From this perspective, a key feature of structural reform cases is their
dramatic quality. These are, for Fiss, cases replete with “confrontations”
and “threats,” and therefore particularly in need of stalwart judging:
The judge tries to give meaning to our constitutional values in the
operation of these organizations. . . . The structural suit is one in
which a judge, confronting a state bureaucracy over values of
constitutional dimension, undertakes to restructure the organization
to eliminate a threat to those values posed by the present
institutional arrangements. The injunction is the means by which
these reconstructive directives are transmitted.37
Likewise, Colin Diver explained in the context of custodial institution
litigation that decree development and enforcement are complex and
contentious processes:
The decree usually has followed an extended process that began
with a court order to the defendants to submit a comprehensive plan
for the eradication of violations and continued through lengthy
negotiations and revisions. Promulgation of the decree has not
terminated the litigation but instead simply has initiated a process of
enforcement extending into the indefinite future. Ordinarily, the
court has appointed an individual or a committee to monitor the
defendants’ compliance and to recommend corrective measures, but
often it must reenter the dispute repeatedly to interpret or to modify
the original order or to invoke its coercive powers to secure
compliance.38
This observation of intense judicial involvement—whether as adjudicator,
manager, or enforcer—is the dominant takeaway of much of the structural
reform literature. Whatever their precise role, judges’ “time-consuming
and cumbersome supervision” is said to be characteristic of structural
reform litigation.39

36. Id.
37. Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 10, at 2.
38. Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in
Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 52 (1979) (footnote call numbers omitted).
39. Adam M. Gershowitz, Raise the Proof: A Default Rule for Indigent Defense, 40 CONN. L.
REV. 85, 123 (2007).
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Even some observers less focused on the role of the judge agree that
these cases are likely to be extremely drawn out and contentious,
characterized by endless squabbles over implementation. In a 2007 article,
John Jeffries and George Rutherglen, for example, highlighted the
importance of consent decrees rather than litigation in structural reform
cases, but their description nonetheless emphasizes the conflict in the
proceedings, which, they observe, “came to resemble a form of supervised
political bargaining.”40 And Ross Sandler and David Schoenbrod have
criticized public law litigation for the authority it offers plaintiffs’ lawyers
in countless rounds of post-liability negotiations.41
Discussion of public law litigation sometimes focused on the public
status of the defendants. But usually, employment discrimination cases
were considered part and parcel of the phenomenon of structural reform
litigation. Abram Chayes, for example, described employment
discrimination cases as one of the “avatars of this new form of
litigation.”42 Similarly, Maimon Schwarzchild labeled Title VII litigation a
“formidable example” of public law or structural litigation.43
Discrimination cases brought against private employers were classified as
“public” based on their broad impact. As Schwarzchild explained:
The outcome of a Title VII case may be to restructure an
employer’s entire process of selecting, hiring, training, assigning,
promoting, and firing staff. Such a remedy affects not only the
parties—the plaintiffs and the employer—but also the incumbent
employees, future applicants, and the economic and moral interests
of society as a whole.44
Thus, the employment class action, which aimed at reforming an
employer’s personnel practices to eradicate systemic bias, was viewed as a
prototypical example of public law litigation in the scholarly literature.
Because of its emphasis on the dramatic quality of this litigation,
characterized by intense litigation battles, on-going judicial involvement

40. John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95 CAL. L. REV.
1387, 1409 (2007).
41. For examples of a litigant-focused analysis that makes these points, see generally ROSS
SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN
GOVERNMENT (2003); Ross Sandler & David Schoenbrod, From Status to Contract and Back Again:
Consent Decrees in Institutional Reform Litigation, 27 REV. LITIG. 115 (2007).
42. Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 11, at 1284.
43. Schwarzchild, Public Law by Private Bargain, supra note 12, at 893.
44. Id.
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and persistent disputing over implementation, we refer to this depiction of
structural reform litigation in employment as the gladiator theory.
B. The Collaboration Theory
Over the past decade, a number of scholars have articulated a new
vision of institutional reform litigation, representing a distinct break from
traditional interpretations of public law litigation. For example, Charles
Sabel and William Simon argue that “[t]he evolution of structural
remedies in recent decades can be usefully stylized as a shift away from
command-and-control injunctive regulation toward experimentalist
intervention.”45 Building on “democratic experimentalist” ideas about
regulation46 they explain:
[E]xperimentalist regulation combines more flexible and
provisional norms with procedures for ongoing stakeholder
participation and measured accountability. . . . [T]he governing
norms are general standards that express the goals the parties are
expected to achieve—that is, outputs rather than inputs. Typically,
the regime leaves the parties with a substantial range of discretion
as to how to achieve these goals. At the same time, it specifies both
standards and procedures for the measurement of the institution’s
performance.47
This vision of public law litigation is less conflict-suffused than the
gladiator literature cited above. The law still plays a key role—the
assertion of rights can destabilize the established practices of public
institutions. However, rather than relying on top-down, fixed-rule
solutions imposed by a court, that destabilization can “open up” an
organization to an on-going process of deliberation among parties and
stakeholders in order to resolve problems organically. “[B]ecause
experimentalist remedies contemplate a permanent process of ramifying,
participatory self-revision rather than a one-time readjustment to fixed
criteria,”48 significant post-decretal engagement by the parties, under the
supervision of the court, is contemplated. On the other hand, courts are

45. Sabel & Simon, Destabilization Rights, supra note 17, at 1019.
46. See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Joanne Scott & David M. Trubek, Mind the Gap:
Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union, 8 EUR. L.J. 1 (2002).
47. Sabel & Simon, Destabilization Rights, supra note 17, at 1019.
48. Id. at 1020.
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less involved in the shaping of specific remedies than under the traditional
vision: “the norms that define compliance at any one moment are the work
not of the judiciary, but of the actors who live by them.”49
Building on this vision, some employment law scholars have argued
for a structural response to employment discrimination. They argue that
the nature of discriminatory bias in the workplace has changed in form.
Early litigation efforts focused on eliminating overt forms of race and
gender subordination in the workplace. Today, although “whites only”
employment listings and explicit race or gender classifications have
largely disappeared, significant disparities in employment outcomes
persist along race and gender lines, the result of more subtle forms of bias
that block the progress of racial minorities and women in the workplace.
These forms of “second generation discrimination” are the product of
workplace structures, rather than “deliberate exclusion or subordination
based on race or gender.”50 Scholars attribute second-generation
discrimination to psychological processes, such as unconscious racism or
implicit cognitive bias,51 as well as a firm’s culture and organizational
structure. Susan Sturm, for example, argues that patterns of interaction
such as undermining or “freezing out” by colleagues, or exclusion from
important training and mentoring opportunities can block the progress of
members of disfavored groups.52 Tristin Green similarly argues that
developments such as the breakdown of internal labor markets, the
replacement of fixed job ladders with “flattened hierarchies,” the emphasis
on flexibility and the growth of peer assessments, which diffuse
responsibility for decision making, make it more difficult to identify
discrete discriminatory acts.53 Importantly, this form of discrimination
results not from a discrete, individual action, but from “ongoing patterns
of interaction shaped by organizational culture.”54

49. Id.
50. Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18, at 466–68.
51. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995);
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Ann C. McGinley, !Viva La Evolución!: Recognizing Unconscious
Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415 (2000).
52. See Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18, at 468–69.
53. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 18, at 99–104. See generally
Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for
Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001).
54. Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18, at 470.
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Citing these changes in the nature of discrimination and the
organization of work, a number of scholars have argued that antidiscrimination law must change as well. Some have argued for amending
Title VII’s liability standards.55 Others, more relevant to this project, have
argued that because bias results from organizational structure, any
effective remedy must be “structural” as well. Thus, Green argues that a
“contextualized, multifaceted problem-solving process [is] needed for
change.”56 Similarly, Sturm calls for a “de-centered, holistic, and dynamic
approach” to litigation57 that encourages “the development of institutions
and processes to enact general norms in particular contexts. . . . [and]
experimentation with respect to information gathering, organizational
design, incentive structures, measures of effectiveness, and methods of
institutionalizing accountability . . . .”58
Similarly observing a shift away from traditional command and control
regulation, Cynthia Estlund sees the “potential to create new mechanisms
for the enforcement of employee rights and labor standards.”59 Although
her focus is on basic labor standards, such as minimum wage and overtime
requirements and health and safety regulations, Estlund’s analysis
encompasses the trend toward self-regulation in the enforcement of antidiscrimination norms as well. In her view, effective self-regulation must
be “‘tripartite’ in structure”—that is, “[i]t requires the participation of the
government, the regulated firm, and the workers for whose benefit the
relevant legal norms exist.”60 Establishing meaningful tripartism has been
made more difficult, however, by the steep decline in unionization rates.
Thus, she argues that a crucial element of any effective regime of selfregulation is “[i]ndependent outside monitoring with direct input from
employees.”61 Employee participation is essential to the success of selfregulation because employee representatives can not only help devise and

55. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title VII:
Some Contemporary Influences, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2370 (1994); David Benjamin Oppenheimer,
Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (1993); Green, Discrimination in Workplace
Dynamics, supra note 18.
56. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 18, at 156.
57. Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18, at 462.
58. Id. at 463.
59. Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 319, 321 (2005) [hereinafter Estlund, Rebuilding the Law].
60. Id. at 323.
61. Id. at 356.
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implement flexible, relevant substantive changes in the workplace, they
are also in the best position to monitor firm compliance.62
This recent work on experimentalist forms of litigated remedies has
both descriptive and normative components. As a descriptive matter, it
asserts that the elements of such an approach are emerging in actual
practice. Thus, Green points to the terms of several recent settlement
agreements and consent decrees as exemplars of efforts that address
structural concerns.63 Similarly, Sturm explores three cases studies as
concrete examples of new types of collaborative efforts to identify and
address manifestations of workplace bias.64
The normative implications of this work are more ambiguous. Although
some scholars, particularly Sturm, appear to strongly endorse a
collaborative problem-solving approach within anti-discrimination
litigation, others are more ambivalent. Green observes that the complexity
of structural discrimination and the need for collaborative, flexible
problem-solving raises the risk that attempts at structural change will
“trigger symbolic rather than meaningful organizational reform.”65 Estlund
similarly worries that an emphasis on self-regulation has “the potential to
divert crucial public resources from the task of securing compliance with
public norms.”66 Some scholars are outright critical of the collaborative
approach. Samuel Bagenstos, for example, expresses skepticism that it
will be successful, in part because it entails deference to “professional
communities—such as those of human relations professionals and
lawyers—that are as likely to subvert as to promote norms of workplace
equality.”67 Much of the uncertainty and skepticism about the
collaborative approach stem from the findings of organizational
sociologists, whose work we explore in the next Part.

62. Id. at 358.
63. See Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 18, at 155.
64. See Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18, at 491.
65. Green, Targeting Workplace Context, supra note 20, at 709. See also Green, Future of
Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, supra note 3, at 449 (“The risk remains . . . that courts and other
players—including class action lawyers—will defer to employer-initiated compliance efforts or will
rubber stamp symbolic measures over effective ones.”)
66. Estlund, Rebuilding the Law, supra note 59, at 321.
67. Bagenstos, Structural Turn, supra note 20, at 3.
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C. The Managerialism Theory
In research spanning decades, sociologists Lauren Edelman, Frank
Dobbin, and others have documented the ways in which the legal ideals of
civil rights laws are constructed and reconstructed as those prescriptions
move from the legal domain into organizations. Their work does not focus
on injunctive remedies per se, but instead on how firms respond to the
general litigation threat posed by Title VII and other anti-discrimination
statutes. They explain that when confronted with the legal mandate
forbidding discrimination, firms sought to develop responses that signaled
“a visible commitment to the law.”68 At the same time, firms viewed antidiscrimination mandates as potentially in conflict with managerial
interests in exercising broad discretion and operating efficiently. When a
law like Title VII is “ambiguous, procedural in emphasis, and difficult to
enforce,” it is “especially open to organizational mediation.”69 In other
words, ambiguity leaves firms greater leeway to “construct the law in a
manner that is minimally disruptive to the status quo,”70 and as they
internalize the law, it becomes “infused with managerial values.”71
The process unfolded over time, with personnel professionals gaining
influence in defining compliance and courts ratifying those responses.
Dobbin writes that “[i]t was civil rights activists who fought for equal
opportunity in employment . . . . [b]ut it was personnel managers who
defined what job discrimination was and was not. . . . In the absence of
clear government guidelines, personnel experts modeled compliance
measures on classical personnel practices.”72 As these measures spread
among firms, courts in turn begin to defer, taking these common
organizational practices as evidence of good faith compliance and thereby
ratifying the rationality of these responses. For example, the notion that
firms should institute internal EEO grievance procedures to reduce their
risks of liability is now widely accepted. Edelman, Uggen, and Erlanger
recount, however, that this “accepted wisdom” emerged at a time when
there was little empirical evidence that internal grievance procedures
either reduced the incidence of external claims or would be accepted as a

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Edelman, Legal Ambiguity, supra note 22, at 1542.
Id. at 1536, 1542.
Id. at 1535.
Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric, supra note 22, at 1592.
DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 22, at 220.
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legal defense in court.73 Nevertheless, accounts of the value of grievance
procedures were “told and retold”74 so that such procedures came to be
equated with rational practices, and firms seeking to demonstrate
compliance with the legal mandate adopted these procedures. Eventually
the Supreme Court joined the chorus, authoritatively, when it held that
employers that had grievance procedures could assert an affirmative
defense against claims of hostile work environment sexual harassment
under some circumstances.75 By endorsing existing practices, the Court
transformed grievance systems into a rational liability-reduction response.
In a similar manner, other organizational responses to the antidiscrimination mandate have become part of a standard bureaucratic set of
responses to the legal prohibitions against employment discrimination. In
addition to grievance procedures, firms typically adopt explicit antidiscrimination policies and often require “sensitivity training” of managers
or employees; they also include equal employment opportunity
affirmations in their job advertising, or adopt other kinds of diversity
programs.76 Many scholars are extremely skeptical about the efficacy of
these measures, dismissing much of the modern diversity toolkit as mere
window dressing that signals EEO compliance while doing little to
promote equality or unbiased decision-making in the workplace.77 But

73. See Edelman et al., Endogeneity of Legal Regulation, supra note 21, at 409.
74. Id. at 408.
75. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807–08 (1998); Burlington Indus. Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
76. See, e.g., Frank Dobbin & Erin L. Kelly, How to Stop Harassment: Professional
Construction of Legal Compliance in Organizations, 112 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1203 (2007) [hereinafter
Dobbin & Kelly, How to Stop Harassment]; Alexandra Kalev, Frank Dobbin, & Erin Kelly, Best
Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity
Policies, 71 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 589 (2006) [hereinafter Kalev, Dobbin, & Kelly, Best
Practices].
77. See, e.g., Bagenstos, Structural Turn, supra note 20, at 29 (expressing skepticism that
responses like dispute resolution procedures and training programs actually result in equal treatment
and non-discrimination); Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor Substitute for a Pound
of Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment
Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 4–6 (2001) [hereinafter Bisom-Rapp, Ounce
of Prevention] (arguing that anti-discrimination training may actually increase bias and undermine
enforcement of employment discrimination law); Edelman et al., Endogeneity of Legal Regulation,
supra note 21 (finding that EEO grievance procedures represented strategic attempts at rational
compliance given lack of evidence of their value when initially adopted); Joanna L. Grossman, The
Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 4–5 (2003) (contending that sexual harassment grievance procedures and
training programs represent a triumph of form over substance); Kalev, Dobbin, & Kelly, Best
Practices, supra note 76, at 610–11 (evaluating efficacy of corporate EEO policies and finding that
some have little or no effect on increasing diversity in management); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic
Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003) (arguing that
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whether they work or not, these sorts of managerialist responses are now
prevalent.
The sociological literature on managerialist responses to antidiscrimination laws and norms focuses on how firms generally interpret
and adapt to the law, however, not on their response to targeted litigation
and specific types of injunctions.78 In contrast, the traditional literature on
structural reform highlights the impact of litigated reform efforts,
suggesting that injunctive orders provoke different responses than the
mere liability-creating statute and the resulting litigation threat. Selmi’s
work bridges the gap between these two strands. He argues that while
earlier public law litigation imposed meaningful remedies like redesigned
employment tests or preferential hiring for discrimination victims,79 in
more recent class actions, private litigants have been content with
remedies like EEO training and diversity initiatives—the types of
responses documented—and frequently criticized—in the managerialism
literature.
Selmi is highly critical of the shift: “Not so long ago, class action
employment discrimination suits were defined as a quintessential form of
public law litigation where monetary relief was generally viewed as one
component of necessary remedial relief, and a far less important
component than the institutional reform the suit ultimately produced.”80
By contrast, he argues that today “employment discrimination litigation
has become a private affair that is largely about money and public
relations, and rarely concerned with implementing broad institutional

internal compliance structures like those promoted by employment discrimination doctrine are costly
and largely ineffective); Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: the Ellerth and Faragher
Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 198–99 (2004) (asserting that the affirmative
defense recognized in Ellerth and Faragher reward employers for developing policies and procedures
that do not actually deter sexual harassment).
78. To the extent that the sociological literature deals with EEO litigation, it is concerned more
with damage actions and the monetary incentives they create than with injunctive requirements.
Alexandra Kalev & Frank Dobbin, Enforcement of Civil Rights Law in Private Workplaces: The
Effects of Compliance Reviews and Lawsuits Over Time, 31 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 855 (2006); Sheryl
Skaggs, Producing Change or Bagging Opportunity? The Effects of Discrimination Litigation on
Women in Supermarket Management, 113 AM. J. SOC. 1148 (2008); Sheryl Skaggs, Legal-Political
Pressures and African American Access to Managerial Jobs, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 225 (2009). There are,
however, a few sociology papers that examine the impact of injunctions on workplace diversity. See
Elizabeth Hirsh & Youngjoo Cha, For Law and Markets? Employment Discrimination Law Suits,
Market Performance, and Managerial Diversity (Working Paper), available at http://faculty.chicago
booth.edu/workshops/orgs-markets/pdf/HirshMarketsWin2014.pdf; Wooten & James, supra note 26.
79. Selmi, Price of Discrimination, supra note 26, at 1298–99.
80. Id. at 1251.
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reform.”81 Even when a prospective consent decree is entered, courts have
little involvement in shaping the terms of those decrees; instead, they are
negotiated between private parties who agree to actions—training
programs or diversity initiatives, for example—that are predictably
ineffective in combating discrimination and serve the corporation’s
interests, rather than fundamentally altering its crucial personnel
practices.82 Although he does not use the same terminology, Selmi is
essentially complaining that the private EEO class action has embraced
managerialist responses, rather than more reformist remedies, abandoning
meaningful measures to benefit victims and prevent future discrimination.
Selmi’s argument rests in part on the changed incentives for the private
bar following passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which increased the
availability of money damages.83 His focus is therefore on the private class
action, and he does not claim that his portrait of private remedies describes
the EEOC’s litigation practice. Indeed, Selmi acknowledges differences
between private lawyers and the EEOC.84 One might expect that the
EEOC, as a publicly funded agency, is less likely to be driven by monetary
concerns. In fact, the agency has self-consciously adopted a stance
differentiating itself from private litigants, claiming to target systemic
discrimination for reform and to assist complainants based on the merits,
not the monetary value, of their claims.85 Nevertheless, Selmi’s analysis
raises questions about the EEOC’s injunctive practices. If, as we find, the
EEOC pursues the same kinds of limited injunctive remedies that he
criticizes, that casts some doubt on his theory that prioritization of
monetary relief over structural reform explains the predominance of such
remedies.
***

81. Id. at 1331.
82. See id. at 1297.
83. See 18 U.S.C. § 1981a (2012).
84. Selmi does not assess how the EEOC fits into his model, but he suggests that governmentinitiated litigation in the past looked different from today’s large private class action. See id. at 1311.
At the same time, he criticizes the agency’s recent efforts in large class action suits as “almost
comically inept.” Id. Selmi also suggests that EEOC involvement in private class actions—for
example, as a monitor of consent decrees—might help to restore the public interest focus of these
cases. See id. at 1330; see also Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency’s
Role in Employment Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 2–3 (1996) [hereinafter Selmi, Value of
the EEOC] (arguing that the EEOC “ought to provide some value that is different from what could be
provided by private attorneys since there are obvious costs to having a public agency process claims”).
85. See, e.g., EEOC, SYSTEMIC REPORT, supra note 7, at 1.
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The literature thus offers three accounts of structural reform of the
workplace in response to civil rights laws. The gladiator theory focuses on
large-scale cases, depicting litigation as battle and the injunctions obtained
as intrusively transformational of recalcitrant institutions. The
collaboration theory emphasizes litigation-driven experimentation,
information sharing and accountability as the pathways to meaningfully
reforming biased decision-making processes. And what we will call
managerialism theory highlights organizations’ voluntary responses to the
legal prohibition against discrimination by adopting a standard set of
bureaucratic responses, such as EEO policies, training programs, and
grievance procedures, without much regard to whether they operate to
integrate the workplace. Our purpose here is not to resolve debates over
which approach would be most effective in combating employment
discrimination. Rather, our aim is to examine the activities of one
particularly important player—the EEOC—to understand more about how
it pursues structural reform through its litigation activities.
II. THE EEOC AS A STRUCTURAL REFORM PLAINTIFF
The EEOC plays a unique role in the scheme established by Congress
for enforcement of Title VII and other federal anti-discrimination statutes.
Employees who believe they have been discriminated against must first
file a charge against their employer with the EEOC.86 The Commission
processes tens of thousands of charges annually, investigating the
allegations and determining whether or not there is cause to believe that
discrimination occurred.87 At any time after 180 days from the filing of the
charge, complaining employees are entitled to a “right to sue” letter, which
authorizes them to seek redress against the employer in federal district

86. Litigants are required to first exhaust administrative remedies by filing a charge with the
EEOC when alleging discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, sex, or
pregnancy, see Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012);
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012), age, see the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012), and disability, see the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012). In addition, the EEOC was recently given the
responsibility of receiving claims of genetic discrimination under Title II of the Genetic Information
Non-Discrimination Act of 2008. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff to 2000ff-11 (2012). Alternatively,
employees may file charges with state fair employment agencies where they exist. For simplicity, we
refer here only to the EEOC’s role.
87. See, e.g., Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2013, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Aug. 16, 2014).
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court.88 Numerous charges exit the administrative process in this way,
often before the EEOC has completed investigation, and in the period here
examined private plaintiffs filed fourteen to twenty-five thousand
employment discrimination cases each year in federal district courts.89 In
cases in which the EEOC proceeds to a “cause” finding, the agency tries to
“conciliate” or settle the charge with the employer. If no agreement is
reached, the EEOC may choose to file a lawsuit on behalf of the charging
party.90 The charging party has the right to retain her own lawyer and
intervene in the EEOC’s lawsuit.91
During the period of this study, the EEOC filed a few hundred cases
each year in federal court.92 Many of those cases sought modest
compensation for just one or a handful of people. Although the resolution
of those cases often included simple injunctive measures, such as banning
discrimination and posting an anti-discrimination policy, they essentially
addressed individual grievances. In other cases, the EEOC aimed to have a
broader effect. In carrying out its mission of “promot[ing] equality of
opportunity in the workplace,”93 the Commission has—to varying degrees
over time—emphasized its commitment to opposing systemic
discrimination.94 A 2006 Task Force Report highlighted the Commission’s

88. Section 706 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2012); 29
C.F.R. § 1601.28(a) (2013).
89. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS, tbl. C2A, annually, for years 1997–2006, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/
archive.aspx (follow each year hyperlink; under “Detailed Statistical Tables, the link for “U.S. District
Courts—Civil,” and then follow “C-2A”).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2012). Although the agency was initially only empowered to seek
conciliation when it found a claim to be meritorious, see Selmi, Value of the EEOC, supra note 84, at
5; Belton, supra note 12, at 918. Congress amended Title VII in 1972 to, among other things, give the
EEOC the power to sue in federal court to vindicate the rights of complaining employees.
91. On occasion, a charging party obtains a right to sue letter and files suit in federal court first.
The EEOC may then choose to intervene in the private lawsuit. See OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, EEOC,
REGIONAL ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL (2005), available at www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/litigation/manual. Based
on the cases sampled in the EEOC Litigation Project, this party configuration is far less common.
92. That level of new litigation filings has decreased in recent years; in the first Obama
administration, filings were in the 200-300 range, and in 2012, down to 122. See EEOC Litigation
Statistics, FY 1997 through FY 2013, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/
litigation.cfm (last visited Aug. 16, 2014); EEOC, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, FY
2012 (2012), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/2012par_discussion.cfm.
93. See Fiscal Year 2008 Performance and Accounting Report Highlights, Mission Statement,
EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/archives/annualreports/par/2008/highlights.html (last updated
Jan. 9, 2009).
94. In the late 1970s, the EEOC had a set of criteria for systemic investigation “designed to focus
on the worst discriminators first.” Oversight Hearings on Equal Employment Opportunity and
Affirmative Action, Part I: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House
of Rep. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 97th Cong. 321 (1981) (statement of J. Clay Smith, Jr., Acting
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“unique role and responsibility in combating systemic discrimination,”
defining its “systemic” cases as: “pattern or practice, policy and/or class
cases where the alleged discrimination has a broad impact on an industry,
profession, company, or geographic location.”95 For much of its history
the EEOC has seemed to consider its systemic cases the most important
component of the agency’s litigation docket. These are the cases that
receive attention in congressional oversight hearings, and that the EEOC
features in its annual reports,96 agency histories,97 and the like.
The EEOC sees itself as not only bearing the responsibility to bring
cases attacking systemic discrimination, but also having a particular ability
to do so. As the Task Force argued:
For several reasons, EEOC is also uniquely positioned to litigate
systemic cases. First, unlike private litigants, EEOC need not meet
the stringent requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in order to maintain a class suit in federal court. Second,
as a practical matter, EEOC may be able to bring certain systemic
cases that the private bar is not likely to handle, for example, where
the monetary relief might be limited, the focus is on injunctive
relief, or the victims are in underserved communities. . . . Finally,
the Task Force believes that EEOC’s nationwide presence permits it
to act as a large yet highly specialized law firm with a unique role in
civil rights enforcement.98
But the Commission has not necessarily been successful in fully
leveraging these advantages. The Task Force report itself criticized the

EEOC Chair). These criteria included factors such as low utilization rates of women or minorities and
use of policies or practices with a disparate impact on women or minorities. Richard I. Lehr, EEOC
Case-Handling Procedures: Problems and Solutions, 34 ALA. L. REV. 241, 255–56 (1983) (describing
then-extant provision of the EEOC Compliance Manual). However, the Commission drastically cut
back its large-case litigation during the 1980s, opting instead for an approach that emphasized full
investigations for each individual charge. See Hearing Before House Comm. on Appropriations, 99th
Cong. 332, 338 (1986). See generally Neal Devins, Reagan Redux: Civil Rights Under Bush, 68
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955 (1993). By the mid-1990s, systemic litigation was again a priority. See
EEOC, NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT PLAN (1995), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/nep.cfm.
Unlike during the Reagan and Bush I administrations, the EEOC during the Bush II years never
disavowed interest in systemic litigation; indeed, the 2006 Task Force review and resulting reforms
took place during the Bush administration.
95. EEOC, SYSTEMIC REPORT, supra note 7, at 1–2.
96. See, e.g., EEOC, FY 2008 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT (2008), available
at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/archives/annualreports/par/2008/par2008.pdf.
97. See, e.g., Focusing Enforcement Efforts on Systemic Discrimination, EEOC, http://www.
eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/1970s/focusing.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2014).
98. EEOC, SYSTEMIC REPORT, supra note 7, at 2.
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agency’s failure to bring more such cases, noting that while the “EEOC
has successfully investigated, conciliated and litigated numerous systemic
cases,” the Commission “does not consistently and proactively identify
systemic discrimination.”99 Observers agree both that the cases are
important, and that the EEOC has not paid them sufficient attention. For
example, Selmi has criticized the EEOC for “concentrat[ing] on individual
rather than class action litigation”100 that could help revive the public
nature of the civil rights suits.
Regardless of whether the EEOC could have done more to pursue
systemic discrimination, the agency is clearly an important subject of
study for understanding litigation as a means to structural reform of the
workplace. Although private litigants bring the bulk of federal lawsuits
under Title VII and other federal anti-discrimination statutes, only a tiny
proportion of these—between 0.6 and 1.1% during our period of study—
are class actions.101 Moreover, as Selmi has argued, class action cases are
not necessarily about structural reform; private litigants may be primarily
pursuing monetary relief, rather than reform of the workplace.102 In
contrast, the EEOC has expressly argued for the importance of structural
reform cases and its public statements suggest that it views them as a
particularly significant part of its work.103 As explained in detail in Part
IV, infra, we attempt to identify the EEOC’s systemic cases and estimate
that they amounted to about 9% of its litigation docket during the period of
our study.
Because the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Wal-Mart appears to
make it more difficult to certify employment discrimination class
actions,104 the EEOC’s efforts in seeking relief for groups of workers will
gain in significance. As discussed above, the EEOC is not required to
satisfy the requirements of Rule 23 in order to pursue broad-based claims

99. Id. at Executive Summary, 1.
100. Selmi, Value of the EEOC, supra note 84, at 21.
101. We derive the estimate in text from Nelson and Nielsen’s data, which they generously shared
with us; they assembled a random sample of 1788 employment discrimination cases filed between
1987 and 2003 in seven large districts, and found fifteen class actions among them—.08%. For
published papers using their data, see Ellen Berrey, Steve G. Hoffman & Laura Beth Nielsen, Situated
Justice: A Contextual Analysis of Fairness and Inequality in Employment Discrimination Litigation,
46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1 (2012); Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson, & Ryon Lancaster, Individual
Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil
Rights United States” 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175 (2010).
102. Selmi, Price of Discrimination, supra note 26, at 1297.
103. See, e.g., EEOC, EEOC, FY 2008 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note
96, at 10.
104. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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of discrimination, and observers expect that it will play a larger role in
pursuing systemic discrimination in the future.105 Understanding its
injunctive practices is thus crucial for assessing existing theories of
structural reform and considering the prospects for such efforts in the
future.
III. THE CASE STUDIES
In order to get a textured sense of the EEOC’s injunctive practices
during the period of our study, we undertook three case studies by
interviewing the lawyers involved and closely examining the case
documents. The first case, EEOC v. Dial Corporation,106 alleged sexual
harassment of women workers. In the second, EEOC v. McKesson Water
Products,107 the Commission joined with private counsel and a non-profit
public interest organization to sue over discriminatory pay of AfricanAmerican truck drivers. And in the third, the EEOC brought two separate
lawsuits, each captioned EEOC v. PJAX,108 on theories of sex and
disability discrimination. Although we selected these cases simply to
cover a range of situations—big and medium in size, alleging race and sex
discrimination, and involving differing roles for private counsel—they
turned out to map onto our theoretical landscape well. Dial has some,
though not all, of the attributes the gladiator theory might predict;
McKesson might look somewhat familiar to a collaboration theorist; and
the result obtained in PJAX largely fits the managerialism description. As
Part IV will confirm, however, PJAX is most typical of the EEOC’s
systemic docket. One feature that emerges from the case studies that is
worth highlighting, though it is tangential to this Article’s particular
project, is that the conduct alleged is not subtle second-generation-type

105. See supra Introduction.
106. EEOC v. Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (documents and information
available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=
7947).
107. EEOC v. McKesson Water Prods., No. 2:01-cv-09496-FMC-PJW (C.D. Cal., filed Nov. 5,
2001) (documents and other information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=9099).
108. EEOC v. PJAX, Inc., No. 2:03-cv-00759-TFM-IJS (W.D. Pa., filed May 27, 2003) was a
sexual harassment case. Documents and other information on this case are available at CIVIL RIGHTS
LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=8756. EEOC v. PJAX, Inc.,
1:03-cv-01535-JFM (D. Md., filed May 27, 2003), concerned hiring. Documents and other information
on this case are available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.
net/detail.php?id=8801.
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discrimination. Rather, the allegations include blatant and egregious race
and sex discrimination.109
A. Dial110: A Gladiator Case?
In 1996, Beverly Allen, an employee at the Dial Corporation’s soap
manufacturing plant in Illinois filed a charge with the EEOC, in which she
claimed repeat and severe harassment from 1992 through 1995, and
retaliation for complaints about that harassment.111 The EEOC took over
two years to investigate; in March 1998, it made a “reasonable cause”
finding in her favor.112 Statutorily required attempts at conciliation made
little progress. The EEOC requested $300,000 (the statutory cap) in
damages for Allen; Dial offered $5000.113 The positions on injunctive
relief were similarly far apart. One of the EEOC’s attorneys recalls that the
EEOC insisted on a class-wide settlement, and Dial was equally resolute
that it would deal only with the charging party’s grievance.114
Accordingly, the EEOC filed suit in May 1999, alleging a pattern and
practice of sex discrimination by the creation of a hostile work
environment thick with sexual harassment and sex-based harassment, and
sought monetary relief for all those who had suffered harassment, as well
as prospective injunctive relief.115
This case might be thought to meet the “gladiator” description. Dial, a
billion dollar company,116 was a free-spending opponent, and the litigation

109. For a more systematic analysis that similarly finds a great deal of remaining first-generation
discrimination, see VINCENT J. ROSCIGNO, THE FACE OF DISCRIMINATION: HOW RACE AND GENDER
IMPACT WORK AND HOME LIVES (2007). Selmi similarly argues that the nature of discrimination in
high profile class actions has stayed largely the same, involving overt racial discrimination and
stereotyping of women’s interests as workers. See Selmi, Price of Discrimination, supra note 26, at
1297.
110. This case study is based on review of the district court case docket, the Complaint, six district
court opinions, the Consent Decree, several press releases, and three monitors’ reports, and as well as
on Schlanger’s interviews of monitors Reginald Jones and Nancy Kreiter and EEOC lawyers Noelle
Brennan, Jean Powers Kamp, and John Hendrickson. For the documents, see supra note 106. Notes
from the interviews are on file with the authors.
111. See Dial, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 930.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 941–42.
114. Telephone Interview with Noelle Brennan, former EEOC attorney (Oct. 30, 2009).
115. Complaint at 2–4, Dial, 156 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (No. 1:99-cv-03356).
116. See Press Release, EEOC, Judge in Dial Sexual Harassment Case Denies Soap Maker’s ‘Eve
of Trial’ Bid on Punitive Damages Issue (Apr. 24, 2003), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/4-2403-b.html. Dial was acquired by the German conglomerate Henkel Corporation in 2004 for $2.875
billion. See HENKEL, ANNUAL REPORT 2004, at 60, available at http://www.henkel.com/com/content_
data/2005.02.22_FY_2004_annualreport_en.pdf.
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was intense and extremely contentious. Dial hired Seyfarth Shaw, an
employer-side employment litigation firm with a national reputation for
aggressive defense tactics. Among other defenses, Dial attacked the
sufficiency of the notice it received during the administrative process, the
Commission’s jurisdiction over the broad pattern-or-practice case, and the
conciliation process.117 It attacked, as well, the very idea of systemic
litigation in a sexual harassment case, and the merits of the EEOC’s case.
Judge Warren Urbom, a Nixon appointee to the District of Nebraska
sitting by designation in the Northern District of Illinois, rejected these
arguments in a thorough opinion in 2001.118 The EEOC’s evidence
suggested “that the work environment at [Dial] was sexually charged in a
way that was offensive and demeaning to women.”119 It detailed extensive
sexual behavior targeting dozens of women, including male employees
touching women’s breasts and buttocks, exposing themselves to their
female co-workers or touching their genitals while making suggestive or
threatening remarks, as well as open displays of sexually explicit
materials.
For two years, the case proceeded towards jury trial, which was
eventually scheduled for April 28, 2003.120 In the months prior to trial,
Judge Urbom rejected a number of Dial’s attempts to limit the introduction
of various types of evidence against it and also held that if the jury hearing
the liability case decided in favor of liability, that same jury could then
assess punitive damages as well.121 The EEOC’s attorneys explain that this
was a crucial pro-plaintiff ruling, allowing the EEOC to present its case in
the way most likely to convince the jury to make a large punitive damages
award. Regional attorney John Hendrickson, the lead EEOC lawyer on the
case (and described by one of the case’s monitors as “probably the most
successful EEOC lawyer in the country”122) gives much of the credit for

117. See Docket, Dial, 156 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (No. 1:99-cv-03356), available at
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-IL-0075-9000.pdf.
118. See Dial, 156 F. Supp.2d 926.
119. Id. at 950.
120. In the meantime the EEOC filed another, unrelated case against the Dial Corporation,
involving allegations of discriminatory physical tests for factory jobs in a meat processing plant in
Iowa. This matter went to trial in 2004, and Dial was assessed over $3 million in back-pay, a judgment
affirmed by the 8th Circuit in 2006. See EEOC v. Dial Corp., No. 3:02-CV-10109, 2005 WL 2839977
(S.D. Iowa Sept. 29, 2005) aff’d in part and remanded, 469 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 2006) (documents and
information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.
net/detail.php?id=9306).
121. See EEOC v. Dial Corp., No. 1:99-cv-03356 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 14, 2003), available at
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-IL-0075-0018.pdf.
122. Telephone Interview with George F. Galland, Dial Monitor (Oct. 28, 2009).
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the subsequent settlement to that ruling; it provided, he says, “powerful
leverage,”123 because it allowed the EEOC to “structure the case for trial in
a way that was, we thought, equitable but very favorable.”124 The most
crucial incentive to settle, however, was the prospect of the impending
trial. Hendrickson recalls that at a technology run-through in the
courtroom on the Friday before the Monday trial was scheduled to start, it
was clear to the defendants—both Dial’s corporate leadership and their
lawyers—that the EEOC was more than ready for trial. Even more
important, he believes, was that the trial would likely have been a public
relations disaster for Dial.125 Dial’s status as a familiar household brand
(“Aren’t you glad you use Dial? Don’t you wish everybody did?”126),
joined with the dramatic accusations of sexual misconduct on the plant
floor, made the case very interesting to the press. The result was, he says,
“the folks in the main corporate office wanted this case done; they didn’t
want to read about it” in the newspapers. And so, Hendrickson explains,
they instructed their lawyers to “settle this god-damned case!”127
But with the trial scheduled to begin in just a couple of days, there was
not much time to negotiate. Judge Urbom was clear; he was holding a trial
unless the parties gave him a signed settlement by Monday morning. The
negotiators needed a template, a “go-by.” They chose the decree from a
prior high-profile EEOC case, against Mitsubishi, which had been
negotiated in 1998 by essentially the same team of EEOC lawyers. The
Mitsubishi case had settled for $34 million.128 In the Dial settlement, Dial
agreed to pay $10 million into a class fund to be disbursed to eligible class
members: women who had experienced harassment at Dial’s Illinois
facility between 1988 and 2003.129 The amount was at the time the second
highest sexual harassment settlement in the Commission’s history,130 and

123. Telephone Interview with John Hendrickson, Regional Attorney, EEOC (Oct. 16, 2009).
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. See 65 Years of Dial, DIAL SOAP, http://www.dialsoap.com/65-years-of-dial (last visited
Aug. 21, 2014) (follow “Select a decade: 1950” and then follow the arrows through “Facts” until
reaching 1953).
127. Interview with John Hendrickson, supra note 123.
128. Joint Motion for Entry of Consent Decree at ¶ 17, EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am.,
Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1059 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (No. 1:96-cv-01192-JBM). Documents and information are
available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=
9787.
129. Consent Decree at ¶ 20, EEOC v. Dial Corp., No. 1:99-cv-003356 (N.D. Ill. 2003), available
at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-IL-0075-0006.pdf.
130. In 1998, the Commission reached a $34 million settlement against Mitsubishi, and a $9.85
million settlement against the pharmaceutical company Astra. See EEOC v. Astra USA, Inc., No. 4:98-
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the fourth highest award in any type of case in the time here studied. The
EEOC and an appointed Special Master were assigned to allocate the
funds among the various claimants, with no claimant to receive more than
$300,000. In the end, about 100 claimants received a total of about $10
million in disbursed damages.131 And the settlement also contained a great
many injunctive provisions, some very ordinary but others quite unusual in
EEOC litigation.
To begin with the ordinary: the Dial decree had a typical “thou shalt
not” section, prohibiting sexual harassment and retaliation:
Dial and its officers, agents, management (including supervisory
employees) . . . are enjoined, from: (i) discriminating against
women on the basis of sex; (ii) engaging in or being a party to any
action, policy or practice that is intended to or is known to them to
have the effect of sexually harassing or intimidating any female
employee on the basis of her gender; and/or (iii) creating,
facilitating or tolerating the existence of a work environment that is
sexually hostile to female employees . . . .
Dial and its officers, agents, management (including supervisory
employees) . . . are enjoined, from: engaging in, implementing or
tolerating any action, policy or practice with the purpose of
retaliating against any current or former employee of Dial because
he or she opposed any practice of sexual harassment made unlawful
under Title VII . . . .132
These sorts of clauses are all-but-universal in the EEOC’s decrees,
systemic and non-systemic alike. As is obvious, they do not add anything
substantive to the obligations imposed by Title VII and the other antidiscrimination statutes. Rather, their function is to abbreviate the remedial
process in the event of a violation, rendering the employer subject to
immediate court intervention without a new charging party, statutory
conciliation process, or new district court complaint.

cv-40014-NMG, 1999 WL 342043 (D. Mass May 20, 1999), at *1 (documents and information
available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=
8308); Joint Motion for Entry of Consent Decree, supra note 128.
131. Press Release, EEOC, Monitors Report Consent Decree in Sexual Harassment Case is
Working at Dial (May 26, 2004), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-IL0075-0010.pdf.
132. Consent Decree at 4–5, Dial, supra note 129.
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In another provision typical in EEOC systemic cases, Dial agreed to
various revisions of its “No Harassment Policy” and its complaint
procedure. For example, Dial agreed to “revise its policies . . . to enable
complaining parties to be interviewed by Dial about their complaints in
such a manner that permits the complaining party, at such party’s election,
to provide information in a confidential manner . . . .”133 As in nearly all
the EEOC’s decrees, Dial also agreed to train line staff and supervisors in
their obligation to avoid sexual harassment, and anyone with responsibility
for complaints in how to respond to complaints.134 And Dial agreed to post
notices throughout its plant explaining the decree and the anti-harassment
policy135—yet another all-but-universal provision of the EEOC’s decrees.
The Dial decree looked much less typical in other ways, however.
First, Dial agreed to incorporate EEO principles into its employee
performance management; the decree included a number of “policies
designed to promote supervisor accountability,” promising to discipline
any supervisor who engaged in or tolerated sexual harassment,136 and to
“link” “evaluation of [each] supervisor’s handling of equal employment
opportunity issues . . . directly to supervisor salary/bonus structure.”137 In
addition, the Decree gave specified outsiders extensive workplace
authority and access; Dial agreed to give monitoring authority to three
“consent decree monitors”—one picked by Dial, one by the EEOC, and
the Chair by both parties.
The EEOC’s Hendrickson explains that the ideal monitor combines
“fundamental dedication to equity and civil rights in the workplace” with
“steel in their spine” and a pro-business attitude.138 “To be effective,” he
says, a monitor “needs to see that business can do better without
discriminating, and to want to show the business how,” and “needs to have
a tough side but also to be diplomatic.”139 The parties picked three
monitors with substantial backgrounds in employment anti-discrimination.
Nancy Kreiter, chosen by the EEOC, had previously been a monitor in the
Mitsubishi case and the research director of the nonprofit organization
Women Employed. Reginald Jones was Dial’s pick; just finished with his
service as one of President Clinton’s Republican appointees to the EEOC

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Interview with John Hendrickson, supra note 123.
Id.
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itself, he had previously been a partner at Seyfarth Shaw, Dial’s law firm.
The EEOC and Dial together picked George Galland as the monitors’
chair; Galland, like Kreiter, had played the same role in the Mitsubishi
case.140
The three decree monitors were assigned to evaluate and recommend
changes to “all existing employment policies, procedures and practices”
relating to the subject matter of the case.141 Dial agreed in advance to
implement all recommended changes, unless the Court permitted
otherwise after hearing Dial’s objections. The monitors also had reporting
obligations; they were to assess Dial’s compliance with the decree and the
effectiveness of its policies in achieving non-harassment. The Chair of the
decree monitoring panel was also given investigation and appeal authority
over harassment complaints.142
Appointing outside monitors is a fairly standard remedy in much civil
rights injunctive litigation, but relatively uncommon in EEOC cases.
Although outsiders were brought in as consultants in about 12% of the
EEOC’s systemic cases in our sample, in less than 4%—just nine cases
over the entire decade—were they named as “monitors” and given
concomitant stature. Perhaps the outsider received greater access in the
Dial case because of the scope of the violations, or because the EEOC’s
own relationship with Dial was insufficiently cordial143 to make
monitoring by the EEOC palatable or productive. Or perhaps the EEOC
thought that it needed more thoroughgoing change and that an HR person
who answered to Dial managers would lack the independence or authority
to implement it. EEOC Regional Attorney John Hendrickson explains that
the EEOC seeks imposition of a monitor or monitors only where “the
situation is pretty egregious.”144 And the EEOC’s lawyers we interviewed
agreed that when a settlement seems to need a great deal of follow-up,
they try to get a monitor or consultant appointed rather than seeking

140. For the identities of the monitors, see Consent Decree at 13, Dial, supra note 129. For their
backgrounds, see Telephone Interview with Nancy Kreiter, Dial Monitor (Nov. 18, 2009); Interview
with Reginald Jones, Dial Monitor (Nov. 11, 2009).
141. Consent Decree at 13, Dial, supra note 129.
142. See id. at 13–15.
143. In addition to the case profiled here and the 2002 Iowa case mentioned above, the EEOC
litigated a third major case against Dial, dealing with sexual harassment, in the early 1990s. See EEOC
v. Dial Corp., No. 4:95-cv-01726 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 13, 1995). This kind of litigation history against the
same employer by the Commission is quite uncommon, even for a company as large as Dial—after all,
the EEOC brings only a few hundred cases each year, nationwide.
144. Interview with John Hendrickson, supra note 123. By contrast, he describes “serious money”
as “the lingua franca of business” and therefore more universally sought.

http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss6/7

2014]

STRUCTURAL REFORM OF THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE

1549

themselves to get inside and change the corporate culture. Lawyers, they
say, typically move on to the next case; corporate culture change is what
monitors are for. In this case, the monitors were quite active. They
surveyed and interviewed dozens, even hundreds of employees, developed
policy, reviewed online training, and generally supervised anti-harassment
activities for a period of two-and-a-half years.145
The settlement terms just described might appear to support a
collaborationist account. But that’s not the approach the parties describe.
Monitor Nancy Kreiter says, for example, that where some firms facing
monitorships “want to take advantage of the consent decree, and become a
model,” Dial was more interested in a more limited version of
compliance.146 The reason, it seems, was the continuation of the
conflictual mindset after the settlement. Dial’s lawyers and officers did not
agree to our interview requests, but the EEOC’s lawyers believe that the
settlement was forced on Dial’s lawyers by its business people for
business reasons.147 It was the impending public relations fiasco, not a
sudden conviction that Dial had done anything wrong, that drove the
settlement—and defense counsel’s unhappiness was palpable to the
participants even at the press conference announcing the purportedly
amicable resolution. Over the next several years, lawyers continued to run
the compliance process (Dial apparently had a very small and quite
uninvolved HR department), and continued to believe that their company
had been unfairly accused.148 The litigation mindset was marked enough
that Dial’s own chosen monitor, Reginald Jones, hinted several years later
at the problems caused. Jones wrote an article entitled “Ten Tips for
Employment Class Action Consent Decree Settlement Survival,” and
listed as Item 1:
Settle if you want to or litigate if you must. Don’t try to do both in
the consent decree. . . . Parties . . . first need to let go of the
allegations, facts and issues that prompted the litigation in the first
place. . . . If any party insists on continuing to try to vindicate their

145. Final Report of the Consent Decree Monitors to the Parties and the Court, EEOC v. Dial
Corp., No. 1:99-cv-03356 (N.D. Ill., 2005), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/
EE-IL-0075-0012.pdf.
146. Interview with Nancy Kreiter, supra note 140.
147. Interview with John Hendrickson, supra note 123.
148. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source (Nov. 2009).
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litigation posture they will subvert the healing and normalization
that the settlement contemplates.149
Although it is impossible to determine whether monitoring or some other
factor was responsible, the reports suggest that the environment at the Dial
plant improved substantially over the life of the decree; surveyed
employees reported that the sexual harassment they had seen in the past
was no longer tolerated or present.150
It is worth noting, too, that while there was ongoing conflict, no postdecree disputes developed into litigated enforcement of any type; the
docket is devoid of post-decree interventions.151 As one of the monitors
describes it, “There was resistance, at various points, to things we
suggested, but not resistance that ever stopped anything from happening
that we thought should happen.” Management “moaned and groaned and
hollered and screamed behind the scenes,” but never actually got to the
point of contesting anything the monitors did.152
This case was an outlier in several ways. Its use of a monitoring
team—shared with just 4% of the systemic docket—has already been
noted. It also had more discovery and substantive motions than usual—
twelve, which puts it at the ninety-fifth percentile of resolved cases in the
sample. And it took longer than usual to come to closure—nearly four
years (ninety-seventh percentile). Its decree is relatively long—nineteen
pages (seventy-sixth percentile). But even as an outlier, while the case
clearly generated considerable heat, the conflict was, contra the gladiator
theory, insufficient to drive anyone back into court after the settlement.
B. McKesson Water Products153: Collaborationist?
In 1998, Steven Crutchfield and seven other African-American
employees filed charges with the EEOC accusing their employer of race

149. Reginald E. Jones, Ten Tips for Employment Class Action Consent Decree Settlement
Survival, THE PRACTICAL LITIGATOR, Sept. 2006, at 37.
150. See, e.g., Second Year Report of the Consent Decree Monitors to the Parties and to the Court,
Dial, No. 1:99-cv-03356 (N.D. Ill. 2005), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/
public/EE-IL-0075-0015.pdf; Final Report of the Consent Decree Monitors to the Parties and the
Court, Dial, No. 1:99-cv-03356 (N.D. Ill. 2005), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/
chDocs/public/EE-IL-0075-0012.pdf.
151. See Docket, Dial, supra note 117.
152. Interview with Reginald Jones, Dial Monitor (Nov. 11, 2009).
153. This case study is based on court papers and interviews with EEOC lawyers Anna Park and
Dana Johnson, Consultant Heidi Olguin, and class counsel Tony Lawson, Kendra Tanacea, and
Jocelyn Larkin. We were unable to obtain interviews of lawyers or management for the defendant.
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discrimination in pay and work assignments. The charging parties
worked for Sparkletts, a water delivery company owned by McKesson
Water Products, a billion dollar processor, marketer, and distributor of
bottled water. The complainants alleged that African-American drivers
were assigned routes in low-income neighborhoods, which were often less
profitable than routes in more affluent areas, and then paid them on the
basis of their routes’ profitability.154 Crutchfield’s cousin’s husband was
Tony Lawson, an experienced class action employment lawyer in private
practice, and Lawson represented the complaining employees from the
start.155 He was able to devote substantial resources to it because of a grant
he received from the Impact Fund,156 an organization that provides support
to small firms litigating big civil rights cases.157 As Lawson described the
allegations later, “Black drivers understood that they would work the socalled ‘ghetto routes’ while Beverly Hills would be handled by white
drivers.”158 The EEOC’s investigation supported the charging parties’
claims.159 At that point, the Commission and the parties entered into
settlement negotiations. At first those negotiations went nowhere—
Lawson describes McKesson as “adamant that they weren’t going to
settle.”160 McKesson brought in outside counsel and began a competing
analysis of the racial impact of Sparkletts route assignments. But then
McKesson sold Sparkletts to Danone, the much larger French company
best known in the U.S. for its Dannon yogurt.161 Danone’s French
management had a completely different view about the matter; Danone
didn’t want the U.S. government as an opponent, and also felt much less
loyalty to local management.162 Indeed, French management got very
much involved, even flying over to negotiate settlement terms. In addition,

154. Press Release, EEOC, Court Approves $1.2 Million Settlement Between EEOC and
McKesson for Race Discrimination (Mar. 6, 2002), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/3-6-02.
html; http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-CA-0138-0003.pdf; Amended Consent Decree,
EEOC v. McKesson Water Prods. Co., Case No. 2:01-cv-09496-FMC-PJW, (C.D. Ca., May 10, 2002),
available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-CA-0138-0002.pdf.
155. Telephone Interview with Tony Lawson, Attorney, Lawson Law Offices (Nov. 4, 2009).
156. Id.
157. See IMPACT FUND, http://www.impactfund.org/index.php?cat_id=4 (last visited Aug. 21,
2014).
158. Press Release, supra note 154.
159. Amended Consent Decree, McKesson, supra note 154.
160. Interview with Tony Lawson, supra note 155.
161. Indraneel Sur, McKesson to Sell Sparkletts Unit to French Food Firm, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 12,
2000), http://articles.latimes.com/print/2000/jan/12/business/fi-53114.
162. Telephone Interview with Kendra Tanacea, Attorney (Nov. 5, 2009).
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Danone’s American general counsel, who was African American, was
very interested in cleaning shop in its new acquisition.163
On November 5, 2001, the parties filed, simultaneously, the EEOC’s
complaint, a private intervenors’ complaint, class certification papers, and
a proposed consent decree.164 Judge Florence-Marie Cooper, a district
judge appointed by President Clinton to the Central District of California,
in Los Angeles, held a preliminary hearing on class certification later that
month, and a fairness hearing in February 2002, at which she approved the
settlement. Under the agreement, eighty-five current and former
employees, and their lawyers, received $1.7 million from Danone. Danone
also agreed to injunctive relief and monitoring of that relief’s
implementation.165
As one would expect in an EEOC case, the decree prohibited
discrimination, mandated development of an anti-discrimination policy,
and required EEO training for employees. It also included substantial
document retention and reporting requirements, to enable the plaintiffs’
counsel and the EEOC to monitor compliance and progress. Like the Dial
decree, the McKesson decree had several provisions for bringing in
outsiders—here, an “EEO consultant”—to assist and sometimes to decide
various issues.166
But even more than the Dial decree just described, and unlike the PJAX
decree described next, the McKesson decree departed considerably from
most of the EEOC’s decrees, in a variety of ways. First, the role of
plaintiffs’ counsel was much more pronounced; responsibility for policy
development was shared in the first instance not only by the EEO
consultant and the defendant, but also by private class counsel and the
EEOC. Second, the decree intervened much more deeply than the typical
case in the basic employment terms for the drivers. Pay went from
commission to an hourly wage,167 and—guided, class counsel Tony
Lawson says, by workers’ preferences—route assignments went from

163. Interview with Tony Lawson, supra note 155; Telephone Interview with Jocelyn Larkin,
Attorney, Impact Fund (Oct. 19, 2009).
164. See Docket, EEOC v. McKesson Water Prods., No. 2:01-cv-09496-FMC-PJW (C.D. Cal.,
filed Nov. 5, 2001), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-CA-0138-9000.pdf.
165. See Amended Consent Decree, McKesson, supra note 154, at 15.
166. See id.
167. Interview with Tony Lawson, supra note 155; see Amended Consent Decree, McKesson,
supra note 154, at 15.
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discretionary to seniority-based.168 This involvement of the workers in
deciding the foundational issue of how pay and route assignments would
be structured is the closest thing we found in all our research to a
collaborationist dynamic.
Even so, the decree was also notably managerialist—implementing
management practices widely accepted quite apart from any civil rights
impact. Indeed, a third unusual feature of the decree was its very high
level of detail aimed at bureaucratizing and standardizing the hiring,
assignment, and promotion processes. For example, the Decree provides:
[The defendant] shall conspicuously post all openings in Class
Positions as well as any open positions for Managers using an Open
Position Notice. An opening is defined as any position, including
route assignments and special assignment in the Los Angeles Metro
Region other than a temporary vacancy of less than thirty days. For
each opening, the Open Position Notice shall list the minimum
qualifications for the position, the expected starting date, the
procedure for submitting a bid, the deadline for submitting a bid,
and the location/availability of the Job Description for the position,
and the salary and, if bonus and commissions are part of the
compensation for the position, average earnings potential for the
route or position. The Open Position Notice shall be posted for a
minimum of ten (10) business days in all facilities within the Los
Angeles Metro Region, in a location that is readily accessible to all
employees. The [defendant] shall also post all job openings covered
by this Decree on an online system accessible to all employees.169
The decree sets out similarly detailed provisions governing job bidding,
route-assignment criteria, and route compensation.170
Asked how the decree became so detailed, the participants report
several causes. Private plaintiffs’ counsel emphasized their overall
approach. They had a good deal of experience negotiating non-EEOC
consent decrees, and tended, they themselves said, to take what some
might consider an “overinclusive” approach to decree terms.171 And
because they had negotiated many prior decrees, including in some large

168. Interview with Tony Lawson, supra note 155; Interview with Jocelyn Larkin, supra note 163;
Amended Consent Decree, supra note 167, at 15.
169. Amended Consent Decree, McKesson, supra note 154, at 14.
170. See id. at 14–16.
171. Interview with Kendra Tanacea, supra note 162.
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cases,172 they had many models to choose from. In addition, both the
plaintiffs’ lawyers and EEOC’s counsel reports that the impetus towards
detail came equally from defendants’ in-house lawyers, who wanted
specificity so they could ensure their company’s compliance.173 Perhaps
because of the recent corporate acquisition of Sparkletts, in-house counsel
“just didn’t have faith in the local managers, and wanted to take away as
much as possible their ability to get out from underneath” the decree.174
A fourth important difference between the McKesson decree and most
of the EEOC decrees in our sample is its five-year term—exceptionally
long for an EEOC settlement.175 Additionally, the settlement did not
entirely quantify attorneys’ fees. The decree awarded plaintiffs’ private
counsel $412,000 for their prior work, but Danone agreed to pay
unspecified future fees for securing approval of the decree and
implementing it over that five-year term.176
Finally, the resulting implementation process was unusually
comprehensive. Heidi-Jane Olguin, president of a civil rights consulting
company called Progressive Management Resources (and married to a
federal district judge who had previously been a civil rights lawyer177),
was hired as a consultant; she and her partner worked extremely closely
with both class counsel and management. The consultants provided
training and were responsible for meeting the reporting requirements.178 It
was even their phone number that was posted for reporting any subsequent
complaints by employees.179 They coordinated and led the drafting of new
policy, at meetings involving Danone management and class counsel (but
not the EEOC).180 And class counsel, paid for their time by Danone under

172. Tony Lawson had worked for a number of years with long-time civil rights plaintiffs’
counsel Guy Saperstein, and he and his colleague Kendra Tanacea were able to review many largescale decrees, picking provisions to use as models. Interview with Tony Lawson, supra note 155;
Interview with Kendra Tanacea, supra note 162.
173. Telephone Interview with Dana Johnson, Attorney, EEOC (Nov. 2009).
174. Interview with Jocelyn Larkin, supra note 163.
175. For more information, see Table 5, row 3.
176. See Amended Consent Decree, McKesson, supra note 154.
177. For more on Ms. Olguin’s husband, District Judge Fernando Olguin, see generally
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=
3454 (last visited Aug. 21, 2014); Press Release, The White House, President Obama Nominates Two
to Serve on the US District Court (May 14, 2012), available at http://www.white house.gov/the-pressoffice/2012/05/14/president-obama-nominates-two-serve-us-district-court.
178. See Amended Consent Decree, McKesson, supra note 154, at 11.
179. Telephone Interview with Heidi-Jane Olguin, President, Progressive Management Resources
(Nov. 5, 2009).
180. Id.; Interview with Kendra Tanacea, supra note 162.
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the decree, worked many, many hours. One of the lawyers, Kendra
Tanacea, remembers the effort in detail:
Our aim was to go into the company; we’d have 6:30 am meetings
and explain the consent decree. . . . We went to every drivers’ room.
Oxnard, Covina—Lancaster was the furthest out, a couple in
downtown L.A. Maybe 12 branches. And we did it several times
over the years. And then they would have a couple of Saturday halfday trainings on new policies and discrimination and “train the
trainer” exercises. We were part of all that.181
As in the Dial litigation, where interview subjects emphasized that cases
that called for monitoring required outsiders, our interview subjects agree
that the EEOC simply does not do this kind of monitoring. Class counsel
Tony Lawson counted this as a failing: the EEOC has “all these lawyers
all over the country,” he said. “They should hire some to monitor decrees.
. . . Too often they just sign off and there’s an agreement to make changes,
but they don’t follow up.”182 The EEOC’s own lawyers confirmed that
time-consuming monitoring is not their priority, although they obviously
offered a somewhat different spin, explaining why private lawyers might
be more interested in a collaborative approach than the EEOC is. Anna
Park explained that when the EEOC is doing the monitoring, its lawyers
think of compliance as pretty cut and dried: “For us, you comply [or] you
don’t comply. On the key terms, we’re not really willing to budge.”183
Private monitoring “might create a different dynamic,” she said, in part
because those monitors are “paid by the company to monitor”; in those
circumstances, the business model encourages getting along, and working
things through. “There’s nothing wrong with collaboration,” she
emphasized: “if the company says, well, what do you think is a better way
to do it, and they listen to the answer, that’s fine.” But there’s always the
danger that what collaboration actually means is undue flexibility: “it’s a
strange dynamic, if the company is paying the lawyers. It’s a business.”184
There is clearly money to be made in monitoring systemic decrees,
both for plaintiffs’ lawyers and monitors or consultants. But Lawson
emphasizes that only a very few firms are willing to put in the work,

181.
182.
183.
184.

Interview with Kendra Tanacea, supra note 162.
Interview with Tony Lawson, supra note 155.
Telephone Interview with Anna Park, Regional Attorney, EEOC (Nov. 20, 2009).
Id.
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which is far from glamorous, attracts no headlines, and receives only
hourly compensation with no possibility of a large payoff:
Very few private lawyers write into settlements the degree of
monitoring that we did in McKesson. For the first year after the
decree, we lived in L.A.; we were there every week. [Danone] knew
we’d be there, staying involved. That meant they sent enough
people to the meetings and kept things moving. That was how you
assure that there’s more than changes in HR policy. Private lawyers
often don’t do that. . . . It’s rare to have firms stay involved and do
monitoring.185
So if McKesson is a collaborative case, the features that put it in that
category may reflect the involvement of private class counsel with
unusually pronounced public interest orientation and experience, and an
unusually high level of interest in implementation, whether because of its
results or the regular compensation for their hours of effort. And it seems
likely that the other unusual features of the case—the high level of detail
and the concern for class counsel’s compensation—stem from the same
causes.
C. PJAX186: Managerialism
Our third case, PJAX, is more typical of the EEOC’s systemic litigation
than either Dial or McKesson. In 1999 and 2000, a number of employees
filed discrimination charges with the EEOC against PJAX, a large
Pennsylvania-based shipping company.187 The first complaint alleged
gender-based harassment and disparagement; women told the EEOC
stories of being screamed at by managers and owners using sexually
derogatory terms, and of gender-specific requirements that they perform

185. Interview with Tony Lawson, supra note 155.
186. This case study is based on review of two cases, both captioned EEOC v. PJAX, Inc., one in
the Western District of Pennsylvania, the other in the District of Maryland. The available documents in
each include the district court case docket, the Complaint, the EEOC’s filed Complaint, and the
Consent Decree. In addition, Schlanger conducted telephone interviews of PJAX’s lawyer, Scott
Hardy, and EEOC lawyers Jean Clickner and Debra Lawrence. Notes from the interviews are on file
with the authors.
187. See Complaint, EEOC v. PJAX, Inc., 1:03-cv-01535-JFM (D. Md., filed May 27, 2003),
available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-MD-0093-0001.pdf [hereinafter Md.
Complaint, PJAX]; Complaint EEOC v. PJAX, Inc., 2:03-cv-00759-TFM-IJS (W.D. Pa., filed May 27,
2003), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-PA-0133-0002.pdf [hereinafter
Pa. Complaint, PJAX].
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personal chores for the owners such as picking up laundry and having the
owners’ personal cars cleaned.188 One complainant said she was asked by
a PJAX manager to perform sexual favors for his bookie, in order to
reduce his gambling debt.189 In addition, other employees alleged that
PJAX refused to hire older applicants, women, and people with disabilities
for positions as drivers or dockworkers, and that it retaliated against those
who protested against discrimination.
The charges were filed in two EEOC offices, in Pittsburgh and in
Baltimore. The resulting investigations were apparently only loosely
coordinated,190 but it seems the unsuccessful conciliation negotiations
occurred jointly. PJAX’s counsel complains that the EEOC did not try in
good faith to conciliate the case191; the EEOC’s Maryland lawyer reports
of PJAX that “they didn’t seem to take conciliation very seriously.”192 In
May 2003, the EEOC simultaneously brought two suits in two different
U.S. district courts; a case in the Western District of Pennsylvania focused
on the sexual harassment charges while one in the District of Maryland
alleged discriminatory failures to hire.193
Like the investigation, the litigation process proceeded without much
coordination between the two suits on the EEOC’s part, although the two
cases were inextricably linked in the minds of the defendants. PJAX’s
lawyer, Scott Hardy, felt that the sexual harassment case, in Pittsburgh,
“interjected a lot more emotion.”194 It was the sexual harassment case that
interested the press, which (following the EEOC’s standard procedure)
was notified by press release when the litigation commenced.195 At the
time, PJAX described the sexual harassment allegations as “unfounded
and salacious.”196 Even six years later, in an interview, Hardy continued to
describe the sexual harassment case as “vicious.”197 Far from encouraging
settlement, in his view those accusations “caused people to be entrenched

188. See Md. Complaint, PJAX, supra note 187.
189. Id.
190. Telephone Interview with M. Jean Clickner, Attorney, EEOC (Oct. 20, 2009); Telephone
Interview with Debra M. Lawrence, Attorney, EEOC (Nov. 4, 2009).
191. Telephone Interview with W. Scott Hardy, Partner, Cohen & Grisby (Oct. 30, 2009).
192. Interview with Debra M. Lawrence, supra note 190.
193. See Md. Complaint, PJAX, supra note 187; Pa. Complaint, PJAX, supra note 187.
194. Interview with W. Scott Hardy, supra note 191.
195. Press Release, EEOC, PJAX, Inc. Charged with Sexual Harassment and Failure to Hire Class
of Women for Non-Traditional Jobs (May 27, 2003) (on file with authors).
196. Lou Ransom, U.S. Files Sex-Harassment Lawsuits Against Trucking Company, PITTSBURGH
TRIB. REV. (May 28, 2003), http://triblive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/business/s_136705.html.
197. Interview with W. Scott Hardy, supra note 191.
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and to want to defend themselves even more, and held up the resolution of
the Baltimore [hiring] case.”198 The EEOC’s lawyers, of course, saw
things differently. Jean Clickner, the EEOC’s lawyer in the Pittsburgh
case, describes the sexual harassment that was the subject of that case as
“over the top outrageous” and “really just endemic.”199 And the EEOC’s
lawyers thought the resulting litigation provided pressure that was useful
in resolving both cases. Debra Lawrence, who worked on the Baltimore
case, explained, “I guess information sharing and coordinating our efforts
makes us stronger; they throw a right punch out of Pittsburgh and we
throw a left punch here.”200
Notwithstanding the heat engendered by the case, there was no
gladiator-style litigation. The cases were settled, together, by the
defendants and the EEOC’s general counsel’s office about six months
after they were filed, without significant litigation.201 Under the sexual
harassment consent decree, PJAX agreed to pay $500,000; $300,000 in
compensatory damages to the charging party and another $200,000 to be
shared by four other claimants. In addition, the court order enjoined PJAX
from subjecting female employees to an unlawful hostile work
environment and required the company to revise its anti-discrimination
policy to include a grievance process, confidential investigation
procedures, and anti-retaliation provisions, and to provide anti-harassment
equal employment training by an outside source to its employees.202
The failure-to-hire decree involved more money and more injunctive
relief. Under it, PJAX paid $2 million: $200,500 to one of the charging
parties, a manager who complained he’d been fired in retaliation for
protesting against discriminatory hiring practices; $25,000 to a charging
party who complained she was refused employment because of her sex
and age; and a total of $1.775 million to about 100 unnamed employees—
qualified females who applied for driver and/or dockworker positions over
the three prior years but were rejected because of their sex, and qualified
applicants for driver and dockworker positions in the same period who

198. Id.
199. Interview with M. Jean Clickner, supra note 190.
200. Interview with Debra M. Lawrence, supra note 190.
201. The length of litigation puts PJAX at the sixteenth percentile on this measure; cf. Table 6.
202. Consent Decree, EEOC v. PJAX, Inc., 2:03-cv-00759-TFM-IJS (W.D. Pa., Nov. 20, 2003),
available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-PA-0133-0003.pdf.
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were rejected because of their disabilities.203 In addition, PJAX agreed to
give all class members priority hiring consideration.204
The more general injunctive provisions of the decree were imposed for
two years (a fairly typical length of time, as 71.6% of the decrees in our
sample specified terms of 2 to 3 years), and required PJAX to reform its
HR practices. First were the standard “thou shalt not” clauses:
PJAX, its officers, agents, servants, employees and all persons
acting or claiming to act in its behalf and interest hereby agree to
comply with the provisions of Title VII and the ADEA and agree in
this Decree to be enjoined, and are enjoined, from refusing to hire
female applicants for employment because of their sex and/or age
and from utilizing disparate qualifications for male and female
applicants.205
In addition, as per usual, the PJAX decree required anti-discrimination
training for all employees who dealt with hiring, and the posting of antidiscrimination policies at all its facilities and terminals nationwide.206
The decree also required moderately detailed quarterly reporting to the
EEOC on hiring activity. This too is extremely prevalent in EEOC
decrees. The idea is presumably to (a) allow the EEOC to monitor whether
the defendant is actually reforming, and (b) induce such reform by the in
terrorem effect of the defendant’s awareness that it is being closely
watched. For whatever reason, there was no post-decretal activity on either
cases’ docket sheet. As discussed above, however, it would be difficult for
the EEOC’s lawyers to devote enough time to this kind of follow-up to
make it a strong tool. About 16% of the EEOC’s systemic cases are like
Dial and McKesson, designating an outsider to serve as consultant or
monitor. But in another 13% of its decrees, the EEOC seeks to deputize
someone within a defendant organization who is likely to have both
expertise and a commitment to the value the EEOC is trying to protect.
Both sides agree that such deputation was a very important part of the
PJAX case. Rather than itself engage in a collaboration with PJAX, and
rather than designating a consultant, monitor, or workers to do so, the
EEOC obtained agreement, by decree, that PJAX would create a “Human

203. Consent Decree at 3–5, EEOC v. PJAX, Inc., 1:03-cv-01535-JFM (D. Md., Nov. 24, 2003),
available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-MD-0093-0002.pdf.
204. See id. at 7–9.
205. Id. at 9.
206. Id. at 12–13.
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Resources Specialist” position and fill that role with someone who had “a
professional background in the field of human resources.”207 As a mild
check on its choice, PJAX was required to report to the EEOC the
designated employee’s name and experience. It was then the HR
specialist’s task to ensure compliance with equal opportunity laws at all
facilities and terminals nationwide, to “promot[e] employment
opportunities for females in the traditionally male jobs of driver and
dockworker,” and to investigate complaints.208
More particularly, the HR specialist was to be assigned a variety of
tasks that would solidify and standardize recruitment and hiring process,
including “development of defined, uniform, objective, job-related
qualifications for the positions of driver and dockworker,” and “objective,
defined, uniform, and published procedures for hiring.”209 In addition, the
HR specialist would “implement[] defined and consistent job application,
record-keeping, and records retention procedures, including the
development and retention of applicant flow data.”210 These types of
bureaucratization are prevalent remedies in the EEOC’s decrees; designed,
of course, to minimize the opportunity for bias to operate and to facilitate
both internal and external monitoring. Over three-quarters of the
Commission’s decrees in systemic cases involving hiring or promotion
include record-keeping provisions.
It should be apparent, then, that the PJAX decree fails to conform to
either the gladiator or collaboration theories. It demonstrates neither longterm high stakes conflict nor much by way of ongoing and creative
collaboration between either the EEOC or workers on the one hand and
PJAX on the other. Instead, what seems to be going on—even more than
in the McKesson case—is managerialism. And here, the priority given to
standard management techniques (often unrelated to civil rights) is
coupled with the designation of a particular manager, a human resources
specialist, to carry out those techniques. The EEOC’s role is as a backstop; compliance reporting enabled EEOC intervention, but entirely at the
EEOC’s discretion. No such intervention is evident in the record.
We move, next, to more systematic analysis of the EEOC’s systemic
docket.

207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 9–10.
Id. at 10.
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IV. THE EEOC’S SYSTEMIC LITIGATION
The three case studies discussed above illustrate the variety of types of
injunctive relief obtained by the EEOC during our study period. One could
find some support for aspects of both the gladiator and collaboration
theories in the Dial and McKesson cases, while PJAX seemed largely
consonant with managerialist theories. But what does the EEOC’s
systemic docket as a whole reveal about the agency’s injunctive practices?
In this Part, we undertake systematic analysis of a large sample of the
EEOC’s systemic cases.
The first step in a systematic analysis is identifying which of the
EEOC’s cases are “systemic” cases. Unfortunately, during the period of
our study—cases filed from October 1997 through September 2006—the
EEOC did not itself clearly identify which of its cases it viewed as
systemic.211 So in order to capture the cases most likely aimed at structural
reform, we used seven criteria. Any case that met any one of these criteria
was screened into the set of cases we call “systemic.” The first two criteria
are legal theories that suggest a collective element—allegations of a
pattern or practice of discrimination,212 or a disparate impact claim.213 The
211. The EEOC’s information management system did have a variable on “case type”—”I” for
individual or “C” for class—that initially seemed promising. However, during the years of this study,
the category C meant only that when a suit was filed, the EEOC’s lawyer thought it likely to benefit
more than one charging party. This is clearly not a variable that captures the concept of “systemic”
litigation. (We did, however, include every case labeled C in our sample.)
In subsequent years, as the EEOC has tried to ramp up its systemic docket, its categorization
methodology has shifted. In 2007, the EEOC operationalized the category of “systemic” using multiple
“indicia”: among them were “Commissioner charges,” “suit filings with 20+ victims,” and “suit
resolutions with 20+ victims.” See EEOC, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY HIGHLIGHTS, FY
2007, at 12, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/archives/annualreports/par/2007/highlights.
pdf. Beginning in 2009 (under the new, Democratic administration), the EEOC began to report the
number of systemic cases brought, evidencing firmer boundaries for categorization. See FY 2009
Performance and Accountability Report Highlights, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/2009
parhigh_discussion.cfm (last visited Aug. 21, 2014) (reporting nineteen new systemic cases filed). By
2011, the Commission was counting a case as systemic more simply, if it has at least 20 known or
expected class members. See FY 2011 Performance and Accountability Report Highlights, EEOC,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/2011parhigh_discussion.cfm (last visited Aug. 21, 2014). The report
describes 261 lawsuits filed that year: “These included 177 individual suits, 61 multiple-victim suits
(with fewer than 20 victims) and 23 systemic suits.” And it uses the same categories for the 443 cases
remaining on the active docket: “116 (26 percent) involved multiple aggrieved parties (but fewer than
20) and 63 (14 percent) involved challenges to systemic discrimination.” Id.
212. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-6(a) (2012).
213. Title VII doctrine encompasses both disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of
discrimination. In a disparate treatment case, the plaintiff alleges that she suffered adverse treatment
on the job and that that treatment was motivated by her race, sex or other protected characteristic.
Disparate impact cases, by contrast, do not assume that discriminatory treatment was intentional.
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next two criteria ask whether twenty or more individuals were potentially
affected by the suit.214 The remaining three criteria focus on the breadth of
the remedy obtained—namely, whether twenty or more complainants
received monetary relief, whether the monetary relief totaled $1 million or
more in real (2007) dollars, and whether the relief included an affirmative
action remedy. The first two criteria show that broad relief for a workforce
was likely obtained, while the presence of an affirmative action remedy
again indicates a collective element to the suit.
Using these criteria, we identified a set of 281, which we refer to as the
EEOC’s “systemic cases.”215 Because our initial dataset was a stratified
random sample of cases, we estimate that the total number of systemic
cases brought by the EEOC over the ten-year period of our study was
about 307, representing approximately 9% of the EEOC’s litigation
caseload during that period.216 Table 1 lists the number of systemic cases
in our sample by year and the percentage of those cases that satisfied each
of our inclusion criteria.

Rather, under a disparate impact theory, the plaintiff can show that the employer has adopted a facially
neutral employment practice—for example, requiring a certain score on a standardized test—but that
practice has a disproportionate impact on members of a protected group and is not justified by business
necessity. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 576–78 (2009), for a discussion of the difference
between disparate treatment and disparate impact claims under Title VII. Disparate impact cases are
necessarily class-based rather than individual claims and are therefore systemic in nature.
214. We used both the EEOC’s internal estimates of the number of benefitted persons and our
count of the number of complainants listed in the case documents. If either variable suggested that the
case involving twenty or more individuals, we included it in the systemic cases.
215. These data are a subset of those collected in the EEOC Litigation Project. Our data selected
and coded for that project are documented in PAULINE T. KIM, ANDREW D. MARTIN & MARGO
SCHLANGER, EEOC LITIGATION DATABASE CODE BOOK (2013), available at http://eeoclitigation.
wustl.edu/. All of the data collected in the EEOC Litigation Project are also available for download at
that site. In brief, we began with a list of every case brought by the EEOC from October 1996 through
September 2006. From this list, we selected a stratified random sample of cases for coding, excluding
non-merits cases such as suits enforcing administrative subpoenas or administrative conciliations. We
also excluded a handful of cases for a variety of reasons, such as unavailability of case documents or
characteristics that did not fit our target population of EEOC suits against private defendants. In total,
the Project coded information about 2,316 of the EEOC’s cases filed over a ten-year period of time. Of
those, 281 met one or more of our criteria for inclusion in the set of “systemic” cases analyzed here.
216. Cases classified by the EEOC as intended to benefit more than one employee, all cases
concluded by a contested court order, and all cases listing a trial date were included with probability 1.
The remaining cases were randomly sampled with probability of .45 of being selected. See id. Nearly
all of the systemic cases—261 of 281—came into our study with a probability of 1 based on the
criteria we used for inclusion. The twenty other systemic cases represent only 2.3% of the part of the
sample randomly selected for inclusion (with probability .45). The estimated number of non-selected
cases in our target population is 1,109, and so an additional 26±10 (95% confidence interval) cases
from the full list would have met our criteria for inclusion in the subset of systemic cases, if we had
coded them all. Our sample of 281 thus represents the vast majority of the universe of systemic cases.
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Our criteria cannot precisely identify those cases and only those cases
targeting systemic discrimination; nevertheless, we believe the criteria
sufficiently capture the cases we are interested in—those aimed at
structural reform of a targeted workplace. To the extent that the EEOC
pursued structural reform in its cases, we are most likely to see evidence of
it in this subset of cases.
TABLE 1: SUMMARY CHARACTERISTICS OF EEOC SYSTEMIC CASES FILED
FY 1997–2006

Fiscal
Year
Filed
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Total

Pattern
Systemic
or
Sample Practice
19
18
23
32
34
31
39
32
28
25
281

37%
28%
48%
47%
38%
42%
56%
63%
61%
64%
49%

Percentage of cases in systemic sample satisfying each criteria:
20+
20+
$1
benefitted
20+
claimants million
parties
complainants awarded damages
Disparate
(EEOC
listed in court monetary (EEOC Affirmative
Impact
data)
docs
damages
data)
Action
11%
11%
13%
13%
18%
13%
10%
13%
18%
12%
13%

53%
56%
17%
41%
38%
32%
36%
31%
21%
16%
33%

0%
0%
9%
9%
3%
6%
5%
3%
0%
4%
4%

26%
33%
4%
13%
21%
16%
18%
0%
7%
4%
14%

42%
61%
35%
22%
26%
39%
33%
22%
21%
4%
29%

5%
11%
9%
13%
6%
6%
8%
3%
7%
4%
7%

What are these systemic cases about? Figure A reports the proportion
alleging different types of discrimination. As it illustrates, the most
frequent basis of suit is sex (including pregnancy) discrimination, asserted
in over half the cases. Race, national origin, or color discrimination
claims, grouped together as “race” in the figure, are included in over a
third of the systemic docket, as are retaliation claims. Age discrimination
is less commonly alleged. And as might be expected, disability and
religious discrimination—claims that are more often individual, rather
than collective in nature—appear more rarely (and notably less frequently
in the systemic docket than the non-systemic).217

217. In our non-systemic sample, 18% and 8% of the cases involve claims for disability or
religious discrimination, respectively.
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FIGURE A: BASIS OF SUIT, EEOC SYSTEMIC CASES FILED FY 1997–2006
PROPORTION OF CASES ALLEGING EACH BASIS

*: “Race” includes race, national origin, and color.

Figure B reports the proportion of systemic cases raising different types
of employment issues. As is true of the EEOC’s docket as a whole, the
cases most often deal with allegations of harassment and discharge. Next
most frequent, but far less common, are claims alleging failure to hire or
discriminatory working conditions, pay or promotion.

http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss6/7

2014]

STRUCTURAL REFORM OF THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE

1565

FIGURE B: ISSUES, EEOC SYSTEMIC CASES FILED FY 1997–2006
PROPORTION OF CASES INVOLVING EACH ISSUE

With this brief summary as context, we turn now to a systematic
analysis of these cases. In addition to examining features of the litigation,
we look at the terms of the injunctive remedies obtained by the EEOC in
these cases, whether through settlement or contested court order.218
Upon examination of the litigation characteristics of these cases and the
type of injunctive terms obtained, we find little evidence that the EEOC’s
systemic cases fit the gladiator theory’s depiction of structural reform
litigation as hard-fought contests over liability with injunctive remedies
requiring intense judicial engagement. Instead, these cases appear to
involve fairly modest stakes, low-intensity litigation and, in most cases,
minimal judicial oversight over decree implementation. Similarly, the
cases do not match the collaborative theorists’ vision of contextually-

218. Full documentation of the injunctive relief was not available in all cases, and default cases
tend to involve defunct defendants, and are therefore omitted, so the discussion of the injunctive terms
rests on an analysis of the 215 systemic cases resolved by settlement or court order in which we had
access to the actual decree of orders.
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sensitive, problem-solving collaborations. The injunctive relief obtained in
these suits impose a fairly standardized set of remedies, most of which are
peripheral to the firms’ core operations and fail to establish meaningful
systems of accountability. Rather than seeking to fundamentally transform
defendants’ operations, the remedies imposed reflect routinized,
bureaucratic solutions—the kinds of “best practices” endorsed by human
resources professionals and embraced by firms as a rational (if not
necessarily effective) response to anti-discrimiantion mandates.
A. Moderate-Size Cases
Even when the EEOC appears to be pursuing systemic forms of
discrimination, its cases were moderate in size. Tables 2 and 3 profile the
EEOC’s systemic docket, by year, in terms of the number of persons
compensated and the monetary awards obtained.
TABLE 2: PERSONS COMPENSATED,*
EEOC SYSTEMIC CASES FILED FY 1997–2006
Filing
year
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
All
years

N
10
9
8
14
21
19
26
17
16
9

Mean
41
79
9
34
13
24
25
7
219
18

Median
21
56
7
5
8
8
6
4
3
2

90
%ile
127
351
23
56
28
52
67
17
29
138

Max
163
351
23
330
33
224
216
18
3413
138

Total,
by year
410
707
71
475
268
448
646
115
3502
163

149

46

7

56

3413

6805

 Among cases with documention of number of persons compensated
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TABLE 3: MONETARY AWARD,* EEOC SYSTEMIC CASES FILED
FY 1997–2006. REAL (2007) DOLLARS, IN THOUSANDS
Filing
Total, by
year
N
Mean
Median 90 %ile
Max
year
1997
17
$1,537 $ 957
$ 3,235
$ 7,631 $ 26,125
1998
18
$2,809 $1,238
$11,525
$12,256 $ 50,558
1999
19
$2,213 $ 752
$ 8,847
$11,266 $ 42,053
2000
31
$2,404 $ 293
$ 2,107
$54,158 $ 74,535
2001
29
$3,262 $ 477
$ 6,112
$59,260 $ 94,589
2002
27
$1,123 $ 439
$ 3,549
$ 4,113 $ 30,311
2003
35
$ 792 $ 412
$ 2,254
$ 2,800 $ 27,715
2004
31
$ 789 $ 521
$ 1,500
$ 6,178 $ 24,449
2005
22
$4,463 $ 219
$10,845
$50,153 $ 98,186
2006
16
$ 275 $ 113
$ 800
$ 1,800 $ 4,406
All
245 $1,930 $ 425
$ 3,188
$59,260 $472,926
years
* Among cases with damages awarded (most data from document review;
some from EEOC).

Whether viewed in terms of the number of people benefitted or by the
amount of money changing hands, the EEOC’s systemic cases are fairly
modest. Total damages are not tiny, but neither are these bet-the-company
cases. And while these cases are clearly about more than individual
grievances, they do not generally appear to entail thorough-going reform
of large-scale institutions—at least as measured by the number of
employees benefitted.
From this summary picture, it is difficult to know what explains the
relatively modest size of these cases. It is possible that, given the changing
nature of discrimination, more subtle forms of bias are less likely to
generate blockbuster cases worth millions. Alternatively, private counsel
specializing in employment discrimination class actions might be filing the
big money class actions before the EEOC has the chance to act. The
agency does have the power to intervene in privately filed employment
discrimination suits, but it does not do so often, perhaps because it chooses
instead to devote its resources to unrepresented parties. Whatever the
explanation, the vast majority of the EEOC’s cases—even those that might
be characterized as systemic—are quite modest in scope.
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B. Low-Intensity Litigation
In contrast to the early depiction of structural reform cases as hardfought contests, the EEOC’s systemic cases overwhelmingly involve lowintensity litigation. As seen in Table 4, the vast majority of the systemic
cases we examined—more than 87% of the resolved cases—ended by
settlement.219 A mere handful—8% of resolved cases—ended through
some sort of litigated judgment.220
TABLE 4: TYPE OF RESOLUTION, SYSTEMIC EEOC CASES FILED
FY 1997 TO 2006*
1. Settlement
2. Withdrawal by EEOC
3. Default judgment
4. Litigated Judgment for Def’t
5. Litigated Judgment for EEOC
Total

N
229
3
9
8
13
262

%
87.4%
1.1%
3.4%
3.1%
5.0%

* Among cases resolved by April 22, 2008, the date on which the data-gathering
for this project ended. Nineteen of the 281 cases in the sample were ongoing as
of that date.

Of course a case can be the site of very intensive litigation and
nonetheless end by settlement. That is hardly ever the case in this docket,
however. Most of the EEOC’s systemic cases show little evidence of any
rigorous contestation of liability. One hundred sixty-one, or 70.3% of the
systemic cases that settled, were resolved without a single substantive
motion being filed,221 and forty-three, or 19% of settled cases, were

219. We coded as the resolution in each case the event by which the EEOC’s complaint was
completely resolved, at least initially, at the district court level. That is, if a judgment was entered, we
considered that a resolution, regardless of subsequent appeal, settlement, or failure to comply. In some
cases, as when a district court’s judgment was overturned on appeal, this event turned out not to be the
end of the litigation in the district court.
220. Note, however, that for those few cases that do not settle, appeals are common: the EEOC
filed notices of appeal in six of the eight cases in the sample in which it lost; defendants filed a notice
of appeal in eight of the thirteen cases in which they lost.
221. By “substantive motions” we mean any motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), motions for judgment on the pleadings, motions for summary judgment and
motions for judgment as a matter of law.
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resolved before the defendant even filed an answer. Discovery motions222
were somewhat more common than substantive motions, as seen in Table
5. Even so, more than half the cases resolved without a discovery motion
being filed. Judicial involvement in the typical cases did not appear to be
particularly intense either. As seen in Table 5, the number of discovery
and substantive motions actually ruled on by a judge before the settlement
was quite modest across most of the cases. Only a very small handful of
the settled cases appeared to entail the kind of intense, prolonged litigation
battle predicted by the gladiator model. In the vast run of cases, resolution
might have been preceded by a scheduling conference or two, and less
commonly, a judicial ruling on a discovery motion or two.
TABLE 5: SIGNIFICANT MOTIONS AND EVENTS IN EEOC SYSTEMIC CASES
RESOLVED BY AGREEMENT (FILED FY 1997 TO 2006) (N = 229)
1. Discovery Motions Filed
2. Discovery Motions Resolved
3. Substantive Motions Filed
4. Substantive Motions Resolved
5. Scheduling/Status Conference Held

Mean Median
2.28
0
1.81
0
0.86
0
0.42
0
1.90
1

75 %ile
2
1
1
0
2

90 %ile
6
5
2
1
5

Max
129
110
26
21
30

Other measures of litigation intensity, reported in Table 6, similarly
suggest that the bulk of the systemic cases entailed low-intensity litigation:
TABLE 6: FEATURES OF RESOLVED EEOC SYSTEMIC CASES,
FY 1997–2006
1. Days to first resolution

N Mean 25th %ile
262 562
300

2. Decree pages

215

16

9

Median
507

75th %ile
806

90 %ile
1051

Max
2378

13

19

30

75

The first row of Table 6 sets out the length of the pre-resolution
litigation, which is often very modest. In fact, in about 6.5% of the
systemic cases, resolution is reached in the first month after filing, often
with joint resolutions proposed for court approval simultaneously with the
222. By “discovery motions” we mean motions about what information was subject to or
protected from disclosure, such as motions to compel and motions for a protective order. We did not
count motions relating solely to such matters as the timing of discovery.
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court complaint. In such a situation, the court serves as a recorder and
potential enforcer of the settlement, rather than a forum for dispute
resolution. More typically, the litigation lasted between one and three
years. The dockets do not show particularly intense conflict during that
time, however, as Table 5 shows—an average of three motions are filed
(two discovery and one substantive).
In any event, resolution having been reached, the decrees that result are
not the behemoths predicted by the gladiator theory. Rather, as Table 6’s
row 2 sets out, they tend to be fairly short—sixteen pages is the mean, and
75% have fewer than twenty pages. And their length of time is also quite
short. The vast majority of them impose remedial terms for a defined
period of time—a term of months specified at the outset of the decree
stage. Nearly 72% of the decrees specified a term of 2 to 3 years.
Of course, litigation does not necessarily end with the entry of a
judgment.223 In structural reform cases, the implementation phase may
entail vigorous contestation. And even when a time limit is specified in a
civil rights injunctive case, such a limit might be extended if the defendant
has not complied prior to the scheduled end date.224 Among the EEOC’s
resolved systemic cases, however, only a handful define the decree’s
duration in substantive terms—and often these provide for early
termination if particular events occur (e.g., if ownership of the company is
transferred,225 or a facility is closed226). In just two of the decrees does

223. In all sorts of institutional reform litigation, experience teaches that the most crucial work
may take place after the decree is entered. See, e.g., PHILLIP J. COOPER, HARD JUDICIAL CHOICES:
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGES AND STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS (1988); M. KAY HARRIS &
DUDLEY P. SPILLER, AFTER DECISION: IMPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL DECREES IN CORRECTIONAL
SETTINGS (1977); Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in Structural Reform
Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725. As Lloyd Anderson wrote in a study of the implementation phase
in structural reform cases, “Approval of the consent decree . . . is just the beginning of a new and
crucial phase of the case, that of implementing the promises in the decree.” Id. at 727. See also Selmi,
Price of Discrimination, supra note 26, at 1330 (“[W]hen employment discrimination cases were
treated as involving public rather than purely private interests . . . the filing of the settlement
agreement often marked the beginning of the proceedings rather than the end, as these attorneys
carefully reviewed the defendants’ progress to ensure that the terms of the agreement were being
fulfilled.”).
224. See, e.g., Consent Decree at 10–11, EEOC v. Pinnacle Nissan, Inc., CIV 00-1872-PHXMHM (D. Ariz. Feb. 20, 2003), available at http://chadmin.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/not_public/EEAZ-0085-0004.pdf; EEOC v. Milgard Mfg. Inc., No. 01-MK-1731 (OES) (D. Colo., filed Aug. 31,
2001) (documenting several extensions to the decree) (Documents and information about the case
available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=
8450).
225. See EEOC v. Sbarros Italian Eatery, 2:00-cv-00774-DB (D. Utah, filed Sept. 29, 2000)
(documents and information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.
clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=9187).

http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss6/7

2014]

STRUCTURAL REFORM OF THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE

1571

termination depend on the defendant achieving some measure of reform.227
Nor do the docket sheets show evidence of massive implementation
struggles. Only in three or four of the cases do the docket sheets reflect
any post-decretal injunction-related activity.228 Thus signs of post-decree
implementation struggle are nearly non-existent. Of course much
implementation work may be done without any record making it into a
court file, but one would expect major disputes to leave their mark on
docket sheets.
In short, contrary to the gladiator theory’s depiction of structural
reform litiation as hard-fought battles over liability and remedial terms, the
EEOC’s systemic cases during the period of our study are best
characterized as modest-sized, low-intensity disputes that were resolved
without epic struggles.

226. See, e.g., EEOC v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., No. 1:03-cv-01663-ZLW-PAC (D. Colo.,
filed Aug. 29, 2003) (documents and information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=8387).
227. See Consent Decree at 8–9, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 3:04-cv-04731SI (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2005), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-CA-00060023.pdf (additional documents and information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=7903); Consent Decree at 11, EEOC v.
Eagle Financial, Inc., No. 8:97-cv-03274-AW (D. Md. Apr. 14, 2000), available at
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-MD-0030-0001.pdf (“This Consent Decree shall
continue in effect . . . until the earlier of A. Two years from the entry of this Decree; or B. Until the
number of African-American individuals employed by Eagle at any given moment is within one
standard deviation, at a confidence level of 95%, of the number of African-American individuals
expected to be employed based on the most recent decennial census data available for the job category
of Teller, plus an additional twelve months; so long as that at the expiration of the additional 12
months the number of African-American individuals employed by Eagle remains within two standard
deviations.”) (additional documents and information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=7903).
228. In Milgard Mfg. Inc., there were four decree extensions, from three to five years, because of
compliance issues. See Case Profile: EEOC v. Milgard Manufacturing Incorporated dba Milgard
Windows, THE CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?
id=8450. In EEOC v. Ingersoll Int’l, Inc., No. 3:99-CV-50362 (N.D. Ill, filed Nov. 3, 1999)
(documents and information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://www.clearinghouse. net/detail.php?id=8978), apparent enforcement struggles were ended by the
defendants’ bankruptcy. In EEOC v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Texas and EEOC v. STI Holdings,
Inc., there were efforts to enforce or extend the decree. See EEOC v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of
Tex., No. 5:99-CV-01088-ECP (W.D. Tex., filed Sept. 30, 1999) (documents and information
available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=
9390); EEOC v. STI Holdings, Inc., No. 03-C-0543-S (W.D. Wis., filed Sept. 30, 2003) (documents
and information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.
net/detail.php?id=8764).Other cases do exhibit non-substantive post-decretal activity, such as
notification to the court about distribution of monetary awards, attorneys’ fees motions, etc.
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C. Standardized Terms
Focusing on the injunctive terms obtained by the EEOC in its systemic
cases, we found that the consent decrees and court orders imposed a fairly
standardized set of terms, including simple, rule-based prohibitions of
discrimination. Moreover, the standard remedies were hardly directed at
transforming the structure of the workplace; instead they tended to
emphasize peripheral remedies or impose procedural requirements rather
than altering the firm’s core functions. This pattern does not match the
expectations of the collaboration theory. A true problem-solving approach
would result in a wide variety of injunctive relief provisions across cases,
with the specifics in each case tailored to the unique circumstances of that
particular employer. Nor do the observed remedies comport with the
collaboration theory’s skepticism of traditional rule-based remedies that
narrowly define compliance “as the absence of identifiable conduct
violating those rules,”229 or its call for “functionally integrated”
remedies230 that link the processes for pursuing anti-discrimination goals
with the employer’s core productive and personnel activities. Far from
developing contextually-based remedies in which firms are incentivized to
problem-solve,231 we primarily observed the often boilerplate repetition of
a stock set of injunctive terms.
As Table 7 indicates, the most commonly obtained injunctive provision
is the simple “thou shalt not” command—an order prohibiting the
defendant from engaging in unlawful discrimination (row 1a, 88%). Only
slightly less common is an order prohibiting retaliation against employees
who complain about unlawful discrimination (row 1b, 81%). These orders
take the form of the traditional rule-enforcement remedy as a rigid and
externally defined prohibition.

229. Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18, at 475; see also Green, Discrimination in
Workplace Dynamics, supra note 18, at 145 (seeking to hold employers responsible for “organizational
choices, institutional practices, and workplace dynamics that enable the operation of discriminatory
bias”).
230. Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18, at 519.
231. Id.; see also Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 18, at 144 (arguing
that the “complex, contextual nature” of structural employment discrimination requires an “innovative,
problem-based, collaborative solution” that does not fit with traditional remedies).
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TABLE 7: TYPES OF REMEDIES IN EEOC SYSTEMIC CASES
(N=215)
Type of remedy
1. Rule Enforcement Remedies
a. Defendant prohibited from discriminating
b. Defendant prohibited from retaliating
c. Other requirements
2. Peripheral Remedies
a. Require EEO training
b. Post notice of equal employment rights
c. Distribute notice of equal employment rights
d. Develop/modify anti-discrimination policy
e. Implement complaint/dispute resolution process
3. Procedural Remedies
a. Advertising/recruitment requirements
b. Require objective hiring/promotion criteria
c. Require recruitment, hiring or promotion protocols
d. Require objective job descriptions
4. Outcome Focused Remedy
a. Quantitative goals specified

N

%

189
174
30

88%
81%
14%

188
184
105
72
68

87%
86%
49%
33%
32%

34
30
30
12

16%
14%
14%
6%

20

9%

A significant minority of the cases imposed other types of ruleenforcement requirements on employers (row 1c, 14%). However,
although some were context-specific, they generally were not the type of
flexible, problem-solving remedy called for by the collaboration theory. In
many cases, the orders are merely specific applications of general antidiscrimination principles—for example, an order that forbids harassment
of African-American employees.232 Others respond to the unique facts of a
case, such as orders requiring that certain named individuals be fired, or
not be re-hired,233 or, in one case, an order prohibiting a firm from
sponsoring company events at “adult entertainment establishments.”234 In

232. See EEOC v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 383 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2004) (documents and
information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse. net/
detail.php?id=9454).
233. See, e.g., EEOC v. Lockheed Martin, No. 1:05-cv-00479-SPK-LEK, 2007 WL 4468658 (D.
Haw. Dec. 18, 2007) (documents and information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=6096); EEOC v. Midamerica Hotels
Corp., No. 4:03-CV-00107-HEA, 2004 WL 758054 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 11, 2004) (documents and
information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.
net/detail.php?id=8411).
234. Modified Injunction Order at 4, EEOC v. Custom Companies, Inc., No. 1:02-cv-03768, 2007
WL 1810495 (N.D. Ill. June 21, 2007) (documents and information available at CIVIL RIGHTS
LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=7999).
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another case, the injunctive remedy required the defendant employer, a
private school, to offer tuition waivers for the complainants’ enrolled
children.235 Such a remedy, while certainly creative and context-specific,
does not seek to address structural sources of second-generation
discrimination.
If a collaborative approach is taken to addressing second-generation
discrimination, one would expect to see injunctive terms that affect the
core decision-processes of the firm. Thus, rather than seeking to eliminate
a discrete, identifiable discriminatory practice, such an approach will link
these normative concerns to the firm’s core business or personnel practices
in order to reform those structures and processes which allow bias to
operate.236 An example of a functionally integrated remedy would be the
ongoing collection of demographic data to identify and correct problems
of underrepresentation in certain job categories and to hold managers
accountable for their personnel decisions.237 Other examples would require
reconfiguring job ladders or skill tests. By contrast, “peripheral remedies”
do not require any changes in how the employer carries on its usual
business operations—for example, requiring its employees to undergo
EEO training—and procedural remedies, while requiring behavior
changes, do not necessarily alter the core decision-making processes of the
firm.
As seen in Table 7, peripheral remedies were the type most frequently
deployed after rule enforcement remedies. Aside from the traditional “thou
shalt not” injunctions discussed above, the most common remedies
ordered were a requirement that the employer provide EEO training to its
employees (row 2a, 87%) and that it post a notice informing employees of
their rights under equal employment laws (row 2b, 86%). Far less
common—though potentially important, as we argue below—were
remedies imposing certain procedures on a firms’ personnel practices,
such as a requirement that objective criteria be used for hiring and
promotion (row 3.b, 14%), or that job openings be publicized in ways
designed to reach all potentially qualified applicants (row 3.a, 16%).
Of course, not all types of remedies are appropriate in all cases. For
example, requiring objective promotion criteria might be warranted in a

235. EEOC v. Univ. of the Incarnate Word, No. 5:99-cv-01090-OLG (W.D. Tex., filed Sept. 30,
1999) (documents and information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=8413).
236. See Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 18, at 148.
237. See Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18, at 516–17.
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case alleging a discriminatory failure to promote, but not in a case
involving only charges of sexual harassment. However, the very idea of
structural reform is premised on the theory that discriminatory outcomes
are not isolated, one-off incidents, but occur because the overarching
structure of work permits bias to operate in an organization.238 Thus,
sexual harassment should not be viewed as the result of one bad actor, but
a system in which women workers are isolated tokens, or alternatively,
lack power within the organization.239 To the extent that the remedies
obtained by the EEOC are narrowly tailored to address only the specific
legal issues alleged, they are inconsistent with a structural approach to
addressing second generation forms of discrimination.240
In addition to coding for the most commonly occurring forms of
injunctive relief obtained by the EEOC, we also captured information
about other “miscellaneous” types of relief. Review of these additional
provisions revealed little in the way of functionally integrated remedies.
Most simply entailed more detailed instructions regarding how the
standard set of remedies should be carried out. For example, one decree
required that the posted notice of employees’ rights should state where the
closest EEOC office is located and explain that complaints could be filed
there.241 Another required the employer to provide the EEO notices on
employees’ paychecks, along with contact information for reporting
violations.242
The one notable exception is a group of cases—fewer than 20—that
included provisions requiring the employer to integrate consideration of
managers’ compliance efforts in their performance evaluations. Typical of
these provisions were requirements that a defendant “revise its
performance evaluation forms for managers and supervisors in order to
include measures for performance compliance with [its] discrimination,

238. See Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 18, at 149.
239. See Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18, at 477.
240. This point is emphasized by ARIANE HEGEWISCH, CYNTHIA DEITCH, & EVELYN MURPHY,
ENDING SEX AND RACE DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE: LEGAL INTERVENTIONS THAT PUSH
THE ENVELOPE (2011), available at http://www.iwpr.org/publications/pubs/ending-sex-and-racediscrimination-in-theworkplace-legal-interventions-that-push-the-envelope-1.
241. EEOC v. Arrowhead Bagel Co., 2:00-cv-01860-SMM (D. Ariz., filed Sept. 28, 2000)
(documents and information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.
clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=9000).
242. Consent Decree at 6, EEOC v. Midamerica Hotels Corp., 4:03-CV-00107-HEA, 2004 WL
758054 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 6, 2004), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/not_public/ EEMO-0054-0006.pdf.
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harassment and retaliation policies and procedures,”243 or impose
substantial discipline “upon any supervisor or manager who engages in
sex discrimination or permits any such conduct to occur.”244 In cases in
which quantitative goals were specified, however, achievement of or
progress towards those quantitative goals was not required to be part of
managers’ performance evaluations. Thus, even when injunctive terms
attempted to incorporate anti-discrimination goals into the job
responsibilities of critical decision-makers in the workplace, those goals
were usually broadly and negatively defined.
To summarize, the EEOC’s remedies are quite standardized in their
terms. There is little sign of the kinds of flexible, contextualized remedial
design highlighted in collaborationist accounts. Most common are simple,
rule-based prohibitions of discrimination, requirements for EEO training,
and notice to employees of their anti-discrimination rights. Although the
efficacy of these types of remedies is not our focus here, it is worth
pointing out that social science evidence increasingly suggests that these
are unlikely to be effective remedies for workplace discrimination, and
may even decrease integration or increase bias.245

243. Consent Decree at 8, EEOC v. Valentino Las Vegas, LLC, No. 2:04-cv-01357-JCM-LRL (D.
Nev., Oct. 12, 2005), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/not_public/EE-NV-00420002.pdf (additional documents and information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=8747).
244. Consent Decree at 8–9, EEOC v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., No. 2:04-cv-00503-RSL (W.D.
Wash., June 1, 2004), available at http://chadmin.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/not_public/EE-WA-00980002.pdf (additional documents and information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=8962).
245. See, e.g., Cheryl R. Kaiser et al., Presumed Fair: Ironic Effects of Organizational Diversity
Structures, 104 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 504 (2013) (presence of a diversity program
induced experimental subjects to discount evidence of discrimination); Lisa Legault, Jennifer N.
Gutsell & Michael Inzlicht, Ironic Effects of Antiprejudice Messages: How Motivational Interventions
Can Reduce (but Also Increase) Prejudice, 22 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1472 (2011) (priming experimental
subjects by highlighting external anti-discrimination norms increased tested bias); Elizabeth Levy
Paluck & Donald P. Green, Prejudice Reduction: What Works? A Review and Assessment of Research
and Practice, 60 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 339 (2009) (analyzing 985 studies but finding no solid
evidence that training reduces bias); Frank Dobbin, Daniel Schrage & Alexandra Kalev, Do
Affirmative Action and Equal Opportunity Work? Evidence from Private-Sector Workplaces tbl. 2
(2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (finding negative effect on managerial
integration from existence of grievance procedures); Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, You Can’t
Make Me: Resistance to Corporate Diversity Training (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
authors) (concluding that training programs that focus on legal compliance appear to result in declines
in management diversity).
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D. Limited Mechanisms of Accountability
Critical to any effective structural reform remedy is a method of
ensuring that the defendant is accountable for its compliance with public
norms. One important component of accountability is the generation and
sharing of data about matters such as the gender and racial composition of
hiring pools and different job classifications, the effects of different
personnel practices, and the incidence of complaints by employees.246
Such data is necessary not only to identify problems; they also make it
possible to hold firms accountable for implementing meaningful changes.
In addition, accountability likely requires the on-going involvement of the
court or third parties empowered to identify problems and ensure
compliance with the decree terms. Although the EEOC’s systemic cases
often required firms to generate data about their operations, the limited use
of effective monitors raises doubts about the extent to which firms were
meaningfully held accountable for structural change.
In a substantial proportion of the cases in our sample, the injunctive
remedies included provisions generating data about the firm’s operations.
As seen in Table 8, most commonly included was a provision that required
a defendant to report on its compliance with the injunctive terms. Because
many of the provisions involved peripheral remedies like posting a notice
of rights or conducting training, some of this compliance reporting had
little to do with a firm’s core operations. However, in a majority of cases
(row 2, 56%), some sort of record-keeping, often more directly tied to
business operations or personnel practices, was required—for example,
maintaining records of complaints, the race of applicants, or the outcomes
of promotion decisions. Also included in a majority of cases (row 3, 55%)
was a requirement that employers report complaints received about
discrimination or harassment. Less common were provisions of specific
forms of audit or regular reports on whether quantitative goals were
achieved.

246. See Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18, at 519–20; Green, Discrimination in
Workplace Dynamics, supra note 18, at 155.
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TABLE 8: REMEDIES INVOLVING DATA GENERATION
IN EEOC SYSTEMIC CASES
(N=215)
Type of remedy
1. Compliance reporting
2. Record-keeping
3. Reports on complaints/incidents
4. Auditing
5. Quantitative Goals Specified
a. Outcomes required to be reported
b. Outcomes assessed against goals

%
84%
56%
55%
7%
9%

N
180
121
118
15
20
10
5

In a significant proportion of cases, then, the injunctive relief included
requirements that a firm generate data about its practices, although the
type of data most often produced was information about complaints and
reported incidents of discrimination or harassment. To that extent, the data
generated lends itself more readily to detecting and addressing potential
rule violations rather than to diagnosing structural conditions that enable
bias to operate or to engaging in proactive problem-solving.
Finding evidence of “systems of accountability” imposed by the
injunctive terms in our sample is difficult. The characteristics most closely
capturing accountability are whether quantitative goals are specified and
whether the duration of a consent decree is measured not in months, but in
terms of the achievement of substantive goals. As seen in Table 9,
relatively few cases incorporated terms of these sorts (9% and 5%
respectively, in rows 2 and 1). The other types of compliance measures
identified (10%, row 3) mostly involved setting time deadlines for
performing acts required under the decree, such as making payment to
individual complainants, giving notice of the action, posting a notice of
rights, or conducting training sessions. Thus, they set out measures of
accountability for performing specific acts required by the injunction,
rather than accountability for the ways in which the firms’ structures or
processes might enable discriminatory bias to operate.
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TABLE 9: REMEDIES INVOLVING ACCOUNTABILITY MEASURES
IN EEOC SYSTEMIC CASES (N=215)
Type of remedy
1. Duration of decree specified in non-time terms
2. Quantitative goals and timetables specified
3. Other measures of compliance specified

N
10
20
22

%
5%
9%
10%

TABLE 10: REMEDIES INVOLVING ACCOUNTABILITY TO STAKEHOLDERS
AND INTERMEDIARIES IN EEOC SYSTEMIC CASES (N=215)
Requiring
Requiring
Requiring
Other Roles
Any
Complaint/
Compliance Stakeholder
for
Stakeholder Incident Report Reports to
Access for Stakeholders
Role
to Stakeholders Stakeholders Monitoring
Specified

1. Any Stakeholder Access
2. Internal Stakeholders
a. Internal Manager
b. Peer Worker Group
c. Union
3. External Stakeholders
a. EEOC
b. Private Plaintiff or
Counsel
c. Consultant
d. Monitor/Special Master
e. Advocacy Group

205

115

178

123

53

33
1
0

1
0
0

2
0
0

3
0
0

27
1
0

201
7

113
3

178
6

108
1

3
0

26
9
1

2
2
0

4
1
1

12
3
0

18
8
0

Any successful system of accountability not only requires the
production of information, but must empower individuals or entities to
receive and respond to that information. As discussed above, early theories
of structural reform litigation emphasized the on-going role of the judge in
ensuring adherence to anti-discrimination norms. Collaboration theorists,
by contrast, suggest a crucial role for intermediaries—individuals and
nongovernmental organizations who can “translat[e] and mediat[e]
between formal law and workplace practice.”247 Estlund similarly
emphasizes the role of intermediaries in assessing the efficacy of labor
standards. She argues that the critical elements of an effective system of
workplace self-regulation are “independent outside monitoring and some
form of effective employee participation.”248

247. See Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18, at 523.
248. See Estlund, Rebuilding the Law, supra note 59, at 325.
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Examining the decrees in our sample reveals modest efforts to
empower external intermediaries. In roughly 16% of the cases, appointed
monitors or outside consultants who specialize in EEO matters are given
some role in implementing the remedial terms. (Tbl. 10, rows 3c and d) In
a similar proportion of the cases, an internal manager at the firm was given
some responsibility or authority regarding decree implementation. (row
2a)
What is notably absent, however, is any attempt to empower workers,
either through a union or a more informally created group. In only one
case out of 215 did we see any effort to involve workers in the problemsolving249 and in none was any role created for a union in monitoring the
terms of a consent decree or participating in restructuring processes within
the firm. (Tbl. 10, rows 2b and c) Unfortunately, we lack information
about base rates—we do not know in how many cases a union was present
at the workplace that might have been called on to ensure accountability.
And the labor laws’ hostility to employer-created worker organizations250
might well have discouraged other efforts to involve employees in
problem-solving. Still, the nearly complete lack of any provisions calling
for accountability to line-employees, the ultimate stakeholders in cases
involving discrimination and harassment, is notable.251
Although neither outsiders nor stakeholders within the defendant firms
are consistently given monitoring or enforcement powers, the decrees
do—overwhelmingly—create some on-going role for the EEOC. In nearly
all cases—201 out of 215—the defendant is obligated to report to the
EEOC or submit to monitoring by it. (Tbl. 10, row 3a) Thus, of all the
potential monitors and stakeholders, the EEOC is the principal entity

249. See EEOC v. Rainbow Rest. Props., Inc., No. 0:06-cv-00988-PJS-JJG (D. Minn., filed Mar.
7, 2006) (documents and information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=8368). The case involved allegations of discriminatory
harassment against Hispanic and Latino workers by the employer, a restaurant. Among other things,
the consent decree called for the creation of an employee advisory committee, composed “of at least
one-half Hispanic or Latino . . . employees to review and present feedback to [defendant] regarding its
marketing and advertising efforts.” Proposed Consent Decree at 5, EEOC v. Rainbow Rest. Props, Inc.,
No. 0:06-CV-0098-PJS-JJG (D. Minn. Apr. 27, 2007). The consent decree does not make clear
whether the “marketing and advertising efforts” referred to are in regards to hiring and promotion or
the restaurant’s services, nor does it provide any other details regarding the role or composition of the
employee advisory committee.
250. See Estlund, Rebuilding the Law, supra note 59, at 362–63; see also id. at 363 n.199
(documenting the scholarly discussion).
251. Cf. id. at 333 (arguing that the regulatory model renders employees the passive beneficiaries
of the government’s protection).
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empowered with information and rights of access that might be leveraged
to hold firms accountable for engaging in meaningful reform.
The decrees alone do not tell us if or how the EEOC exercises the
powers it thus acquires through its consent decrees, but the agency appears
to have the capacity to engage in meaningful monitoring. Our data suggest
that there are about seventy systemic decrees open at any given time; that
amounts to fewer than two dozen reports per month, spread out among all
the EEOC’s attorneys. However, neither our case studies nor the systemic
docket as a whole shows evidence of vigorous monitoring activity by the
EEOC. Recall that in Dial and McKesson, where the EEOC’s attorneys
felt there was a need for close monitoring, they negotiated the hiring of
outside consultants to oversee implementation.252 In the more typical cases
like PJAX, reports to the EEOC are required, but the case documents and
dockets do not indicate any post-decretal activity.253 While it is possible
EEOC lawyers spent time analyzing and following up on these reports, our
interviews suggest that post-decree monitoring was not a priority for the
agency.254 In addition, perhaps we see little evidence of ongoing
monitoring because the most common remedies—such as posting notices
and conducting training—are easy for firms to comply with and
compliance is readily verifiable.
To summarize, the decrees in the systemic cases show some efforts
toward holding firms accountable, primarily in the form of generating
information about on-going complaints. Nevertheless, they largely appear
to neglect an important aspect of ensuring accountability—namely,
empowering stakeholders within the firm or appointing outsiders who are
able to engage in effective monitoring.
E. Enforced Managerialism
Our study suggests that the EEOC’s injunctive practices in these cases
are part of a larger phenomenon, namely, the widespread adoption of
routinized bureaucratic responses to the legal prohibition on employment
discrimination. As discussed in Part I.C., supra, a rich sociological
literature has explored how firms have constructed civil rights law,

252. See supra Part III.A (discussing decree and monitoring for Dial), and Part III.B (discussing
decree and monitoring for McKesson).
253. See supra Part III.C (discussing PJAX’s creation of a “Human Resources Specialist” instead
of engaging an outside monitor for post-decree monitoring activities).
254. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 138–46, 183.
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infusing it with managerial values as they internalized its commands. The
result has been the development and diffusion of a number of standard
responses, adopted by firms to signal compliance and reduce liability
risks.255 Although the sociological literature focuses on firms’ voluntary
responses to general legal mandates, rather than particularized litigation,
our study suggests that the EEOC has played a role through its systemic
injunctive litigation in ratifying those responses and in promoting their
adoption.
In our analysis, the injunctive terms obtained in the EEOC’s systemic
cases largely mirror the bureaucratic practices recommended by human
resources professionals to comply with anti-discrimination law in nonlitigation contexts. Several of the most common decree terms we
observed—the prohibition on discrimination and retaliation and the
posting requirements—simply reassert the anti-discrimination mandate
and provide notice of those rules to workers (although they also
substantially ease the path of further enforcement, if further enforcement is
needed). However, the other common terms, such as requiring EEO
training, developing an anti-discrimination policy, and implementing a
complaint or grievance process, are precisely the types of responses
developed and spread by human resources professionals.256 Even the less
commonly imposed remedies in our study, such as requiring the posting of
available positions or the development of objective hiring or promotion
criteria, are bureaucratic measures widely accepted as constituting human
resources “best practices.”257
The terms of the EEOC’s systemic cases are thus similar to those
criticized by Selmi as demonstrating limited ambition to change employer
practices or remedy past discrimination. Selmi’s theory is that more
meaningful structural reform has fallen by the wayside as profit-motivated
private attorneys, focusing on monetary damages, have been willing to
settle for anemic forms of injunctive relief.258 EEOC lawyers, however, are

255. See supra notes 68–76 and accompanying text.
256. See generally, e.g., Dobbin & Kelly, How to Stop Harassment, supra note 76 (explaining
spread of grievance procedures and training as responses to sexual harassment law); Edelman et al.,
Endogeneity of Legal Regulation, supra note 21 (describing development of grievance procedures as a
response to anti-discrimination law); Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, The Origins and Effects of
Corporate Diversity Programs, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF DIVERSITY AND WORK 253 (2013)
[hereinafter Dobbin & Kalev, Origins].
257. See generally DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 22 at 101–32, 220–33
((discussing development of bureaucratic personnel practices relating to hiring and promotion).
258. Selmi, Price of Discrimination, supra note 26, at 1298–99. The EEOC’s lawyers confirm this
account in large part—they report that intervenors’ counsel are generally pretty uninterested in
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unlikely to be driven to the same extent by pocketbook incentives, given
that their pay and other work benefits are not contingent on the amount of
money damages recovered. 259 (Other incentives may, of course, encourage
EEOC employees to seek high damages,260 but they are likely softer than
in the private sector.) Moreover, as discussed in Part II, supra, the EEOC
professes to prioritize systemic cases, seeing itself as “uniquely
positioned” to focus on injunctive, rather than monetary, relief.261 If the
EEOC is less likely distracted by financial incentives, what then explains
its embrace of managerialist remedies?
It is worth noting that in some ways, what we observe is nothing new.
In the 1970s when it was first authorized to sue employers, the EEOC
pursued consent agreements with a number of large employers that
required them to adopt “best practices” recommended by personnel
experts at the time.262 For example, a consent decree with AT&T required
revised salary classifications and the use of validated job tests, while other
companies agreed to change their seniority systems and to actively recruit
women and minorities—all practices endorsed by personnel experts at the
time.263 Thus, the EEOC’s emphasis on widely accepted human resources
practices, which we observe in a more recent period, is continuous in some
ways with its past injunctive efforts.
Yet if the turn to human resources practices is nothing new, the
particulars of the injunctive remedies obtained by the EEOC during our
study period differ from those it sought in the 1970s; remedies during the
more recent period are far more limited. The reasons, we suspect, are to be
found both in and out of the courts. The more aggressive remedies of an
earlier era—requiring job tests to be validated, restructuring job ladders,
and the like—followed Supreme Court decisions such as Griggs v. Duke
Power Company264 and Albemarle Paper265 that defined discrimination

injunctive relief. See, e.g., Interview with Anna Park, supra note 183 (“If [intervenors’ counsel] have
ongoing monitoring, and [the defendants] are paying them, they’re more interested, but for the most
part, intervenors are not so interested in injunctive cases.”); Interview with Dana Johnson, supra note
173 (“My perception is that the EEOC is much more interested in getting ongoing injunctive relief
than the private bar, for obvious market-driven reasons.”).
259. See, e.g., Interview with Dana Johnson, supra note 173.
260. See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement: Innovation
and Optimal Punishment, with Antitrust Applications, 127 HARV. L. REV. 853 (2014) (arguing that
public agencies have self-interested reasons for seeking to maximize financial recoveries through
litigation).
261. EEOC, SYSTEMIC REPORT, supra note 7, at 2.
262. See DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 22, at 102–03.
263. See id. at 103.
264. 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that Title VII prohibited intelligence testing or high school
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expansively. These decisions suggested that anti-discrimination statutes
barred more than animus, and that many previously accepted employer
practices could constitute actionable discrimination. The courts have, in
more recent years, been far more skeptical of this kind of reasoning,266
necessarily reducing the ability of plaintiffs’ lawyers to obtain expansive
remedies through litigation, including by negotiation. Moreover,
especially after the Supreme Court in Faragher and Ellerth ratified antiharassment policies and grievance procedures as harassment prevention
tools,267 it makes sense that both personnel experts and legal actors
increasingly promoted these less intrusive procedures as a means of legal
compliance. Outside the courts, as Dobbin, Edelman, and others have
documented, organizational responses to Title VII and other antidiscrimination laws likewise shifted, as professionals promoted new
practices and in turn influenced doctrinal developments.268
As times and the law have changed, it is unsurprising that the EEOC
has continued to look to human resources “best practices” when shaping
its decrees, because both the agency and personnel professionals were
responding to the same challenges. The mandate of the law is clear—do
not discriminate—but Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes offer
no concrete guidance as to what constitutes compliance.269 In the face of
legal ambiguity, firms are motivated to adopt structures or practices that
visibly signal compliance with the law.270 As Dobbin and Kelly explain
about the widespread acceptance of anti-harassment training programs, the
personnel profession “had a plausible compliance remedy that offered
executives a formalized solution, and judges a bright-line standard by
which they could assess employers.”271 And once the Court signaled its

completion requirements when they had the effect of disqualifying blacks at a disproportionately high
rate without demonstrable connection to job performance).
265. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (finding discrimination in
preemployment screening with disparate impact on black applicants that was not substantially related
to job performance).
266. See Bagenstos, Structural Turn, supra note 20, at 21–24; Robert L. Nelson, Ellen C. Berrey
& Laura Beth Nielsen, Divergent Paths: Conflicting Conceptions of Employment Discrimination in
Law and the Social Sciences, 4 ANN. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 103, 104–07 (2008).
267. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742 (1998).
268. See generally DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 22, at 220–32; see also,
e.g., Edelman et al., Endogeneity of Legal Regulation, supra note 21.
269. See Edelman, Legal Ambiguity, supra note 22, at 1537.
270. Id. at 1542.
271. Dobbin & Kelly, supra note 76, at 1237.
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acceptance of these structures as a sign of compliance,272 companies had
all the more reason to adopt them. As one employer-side lawyer explained,
“The beauty of these rulings is that companies now know what they have
to do: They have to advertise a no-harassment policy, run training
programs and have a discipline-response mechanism. If the company does
those things, they can defend against these cases.”273 Similarly, when
pursuing systemic cases, the EEOC needed concrete remedies it could
impose that would manifest firms’ compliance with the law. The “best
practices” adopted by leading organizations and promoted by personnel
professionals offered a solution—plausible forms of compliance that are
visible and readily verifiable.
An additional plausible reason the EEOC has repeatedly drawn on
bureaucratic solutions to enforcement problems is that the Commission is
itself a large bureaucratic organization. Managerialist remedies may
appear familiar to its lawyers from the EEOC’s own employment
practices, and in any event such remedies meet the agency’s need to
rationalize and standardize its core function of enforcing antidiscrimination norms in the workplace. The EEOC must coordinate the
work of scores of attorneys across the country to advance a common goal,
and it utilizes several levers to direct their activities. For example, it
distributes a Compliance Manual with sample decrees, and draft decrees
are reviewed at the regional level and, for decrees with over twenty
benefitted parties, at the national level as well. As a result, as EEOC
regional attorney John Hendrickson says, “The consent decrees look
awfully cookie cutter, and they are.”274

272. In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), and Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), the Supreme Court held that in cases that did not involve a tangible
employment action such as demotion or firing, an employer can assert an affirmative defense to
liability for sexual harassment when it “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior” and “the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer”. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765. It then
suggested that the affirmative defense is more likely available to an employer that had promulgated an
anti-harassment policy and provided a complaint procedure. Id.
273. Walter Connolly, Jr., the attorney who represented Mitsubishi in the class action suit against
it, made this comment in an interview following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Faragher and
Ellerth. DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 22, at 214 (citing Jane Daugherty,
Racial Discrimination Charges Rise in Michigan, DETROIT NEWS, July 15, 1998).
274. Interview with John Hendrickson, supra note 123.
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CONCLUSION: ASSESSING THE EEOC’S SYSTEMIC EFFORTS
This Article’s project is positive, not normative. Nevertheless, we
briefly consider in conclusion how our examination of the nature of the
EEOC’s injunctive practice bears on various normative claims in the
literature.
Our study of the EEOC’s systemic cases suggests that the consent
decrees it obtains primarily implement managerialist remedies—the
policies and structures considered “best practices” by many firms and
human resources professionals. If this depiction is accurate, is it a
problem? A number of scholars have been highly critical of the legal
profession’s embrace of managerialist responses, and their criticism would
likely extend to the EEOC practices we document as well. Bagenstos, for
example, concludes that “there is scant evidence that the responses urged
[by lawyers and consultants] actually result in equal treatment or unbiased
decisionmaking.”275 Similarly, Selmi describes these types of remedies as
“cosmetic in nature” and “primarily designed to address public relations
problems,”276 while Bisom-Rapp dismisses training programs as
“symbolic gestures” whose efficacy has little empirical support.277
Scholars are correct to point out that, for many standard managerialist
remedies, there is a disturbing lack of empirical evidence of their
effectiveness in redressing or preventing discrimination.278 In particular,
the heavy emphasis on EEO and sexual harassment training in the courts
and by the legal profession is troubling. Studies do not support the claim
that these programs can change employee attitudes; indeed, evidence
suggests that if poorly conducted, they can produce backlash harmful to
women and minority employees.279 In light of these concerns, the
frequency with which the EEOC negotiates training as a court-enforceable
remedy raises questions about the effectiveness of its efforts to secure
relief for victims of discrimination.
We agree wholeheartedly that more empirical evidence is needed,
rather than assuming that a practice is effective just because it is widely
accepted. But it seems likely that some managerialist responses are,

275. Bagenstos, Structural Turn, supra note 20, at 29.
276. Selmi, The Price of Discrimination, supra note 26, at 1250.
277. Bisom-Rapp, Ounce of Prevention, supra note 77, at 6, 29.
278. See DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 22, at 21.
279. See generally Kalev, Dobbin & Kelly, Best Practices, supra note 76 (diversity training has
negative effect); Dobbin & Kalev, Origins, supra note 256 (summarizing literature); Bisom-Rapp,
Ounce of Prevention, supra note 77 (summarizing studies).
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indeed, useful.280 In particular, bureaucratic controls may help constrain
decisionmaking in ways that reduce the influence of stereotypes and
implicit biases. For example, sociologists have concluded that
“[f]ormalized practices or formal structures such as a personnel or human
resources department reduce the use of sex and race as hiring criteria by
limiting decision makers’ discretion,” whereas “[s]ubjective hiring
procedures and vague criteria free decision makers to favor persons of
their own race or sex.”281 Similarly, Kalev et al. found evidence that
practices that assign organizational responsibility for change—e.g.,
affirmative action plans, diversity committees, diversity managers—are
effective in increasing the proportion of women and minorities in
management.282 Thus, any assessment of the EEOC’s injunctive practices
ought to focus on whether a particular managerialist response is actually
helpful or not. The fact that some of the remedies pursued by the EEOC
are likely ineffective does not mean that all bureaucratic responses are
problematic.
In addition, even if other settlement terms might be more effective in
any given case, evaluating the EEOC’s approach needs to consider the
Commission’s docket as a whole, not case by case. Perhaps the EEOC
would have been more effective at promoting equal employment
opportunity in a particular case if it pursued a more muscular kind of
litigation—with more aggressive claims for higher damages, more
intrusive remedies, longer enforcement periods, and more onerous decree
termination provisions. But it is important to remember that the EEOC
operates under constraints. Gladiator litigation requires lots of time and
effort, and true collaboration is also highly resource-intensive. A relatively
easy-to-apply, bureaucratic approach to injunctive remedies allows the
agency to bring—and resolve—more lawsuits.
Sociologists have noted that the process of “managerialization of law”
is an ambiguous one. On the one hand, it “has the potential to undermine

280. See generally Dobbin & Kalev, Origins, supra note 256 (reviewing the literature); Kalev,
Dobbin & Kelly, Best Practices, supra note 76 (finding mixed effects).
281. Barbara F. Reskin, Debra B. McBrier & Julie A. Kmec, The Determinants and Consequences
of Workplace Sex and Race Composition, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 335, 343–44 (1999).
282. See Kalev, Dobbin, & Kelly, Best Practices, supra note 76, at 590. Similarly, bureaucratic
oversight that imposes accountability has been found to increase the effectiveness of organizational
practices intended to increase diversity. See Frank Dobbin, Daniel Schrage, & Alexandra Kalev,
Someone to Watch Over Me: Coupling, Decoupling, and Unintended Consequences in Corporate
Equal Opportunity (Working Paper), available at http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~dobbin/cv/working
papers/Someone_to_Watch_Over_Me.pdf.
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legal ideals.”283 Grievance processes, for example, “tend to recast
grievances in ways that downplay legal issues and that focus instead on
more typically managerial concerns . . .; disputes that originate as rights
violations . . . are likely to be handled as interpersonal difficulties,
administrative problems, or psychological pathologies.”284 On the other
hand, as the law is reframed “in ways that make it appear more consistent
with traditional managerial prerogatives,” they are more easily internalized
by organizations.285 When the personnel profession recasts civil rights
imperatives as initiatives that are good for business, it promotes the
internalization of these legal norms, albeit in an altered form. Similarly, it
may be rational for the EEOC to pursue familiar bureaucratic practices in
the Commission’s consent decrees. The EEOC’s systemic cases we
examined were overwhelmingly settlements, and the agency needed some
level of employer buy-in to resolve them short of full-blown litigation.
The EEOC’s ability to resolve cases may be enhanced when it pursues
remedies that have the aura of being good for business. For the employer
faced with ongoing litigation, it must be easier to accept a settlement that
entails the adoption of practices already followed in many leading
organizations.
Moreover, the EEOC’s practices can have impact even beyond its
docket by influencing employer practice. If the remedies the EEOC
pursues suggest “best practices,” employers seeking to avoid lawsuits can
emulate those practices long before they face any concrete threat of suit. In
this way, bureaucratic solutions to civil rights problems may magnify the
EEOC’s influence by providing employers with a road map for
compliance. If more onerous terms were demanded, employers might opt
not to comply until forced through litigation. On net, whether the agency
would be more effective by forcing more radical change on fewer
employers than by litigating—and settling—more cases on standardized
terms depends on the effectiveness of the standard remedies.
Finally, the EEOC operates under political and legal constraints.
Congress establishes the Commission’s budget and exercises oversight
authority. If the agency pursues a reform agenda more aggressive than that
preferred by key political leaders, it risks being reined in by Congress.
According to former EEOC Commissioner Paul Steven Miller, “Congress

283. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric, supra note 22, at 1592.
284. Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold Court: Speculations on
the Organizational Internalization of Law, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 941, 967 (1999).
285. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric, supra note 22, at 1592.
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. . . sees us as an agency which is there to manage employment
discrimination disputes,”286 rather than to prevent or remedy
discrimination. If, in fact, Congress has such a limited view of the
Commission’s role, a strategy of settling many cases on standardized
terms rather than vigorously pursuing a handful of transformative cases
may make sense. Legal doctrine also cabins the EEOC’s ability to pursue
structural reform. If the injunctive relief it pursues is less robust than it
could be, the problem may stem as much, or more, from the courts’
evolving doctrine as from a lack of commitment on the part of the EEOC.
As Bagenstos has pointed out, claims about what types of employer
conduct are wrongful and should be prevented are deeply controversial.287
Judges have been increasingly reluctant to embrace a more expansive
definition of discrimination—one that holds employers accountable for
structural disadvantage and not merely intentional forms of invidious
discrimination.288 And as the courts’ conception of what constitutes
discrimination has contracted, so too has the remedial ambition of
structural reform cases. Consent decrees, after all, are negotiated
settlements reached in the shadow of the law. As a result, the EEOC’s
ability to pursue more aggressive structural remedies has diminished.
Whether or not the EEOC’s injunctive practices we observed in our study
period were optimal in the sense of being maximally effective in
combating workplace discrimination, they were an understandable
response to the various constraints under which the agency operated.289
Indeed, under a more individualized, fault-based understanding of
discrimination, the EEOC might find it difficult to pursue even rather
routine managerialist remedies.290

286. Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18, at 551.
287. See Bagenstos, Structural Turn, supra note 20, at 36–40.
288. Id. at 39, 41–44.
289. Scholars have proposed a number of reforms intended to boost the agency’s effectiveness in
combating workplace discrimination. See, e.g., Green, Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law,
supra note 3 (arguing for enhanced role for EEOC); Selmi, Price of Discrimination, supra note 26
(suggesting that the EEOC play a more active role in overseeing implementation of consent decrees in
private class actions); Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18, at 566 (calling for the EEOC to play a
larger role in pooling information and building networks for effective problem-solving); David
Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616, 695–711 (2013)
(proposing that the EEOC be granted sweeping gatekeeping powers over all class actions and systemic
job discrimination suits). Evaluating these proposals is beyond the scope of this Article. However, our
study suggests caution. Giving the Commission an expanded role in private class actions is unlikely to
prove transformative of its practices, unless the political, legal, and resource realities that shape the
EEOC’s activities are also significantly changed.
290. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011),
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In any event, to repeat, our project is positive not normative. This
Article has looked at the EEOC’s litigation but not at what happens at the
regulated workplaces. We do not here assess either the problems the
EEOC sought to solve or the Commission’s success or failure in that
endeavor. And the positive point is this: Existing visions of structural
reform litigation are altogether too romantic. The EEOC’s injunctive cases
demonstrate neither contests to the death, nor collaborative love-fests;
instead, they provide evidence that the managerialism so evident in nonlitigation responses to EEO imperatives is evident, as well, in the EEOC’s
large and influential component of the civil rights docket.

implicitly rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to impose more rational personnel practices on the company.
Although the decision concerned the technical requirements of Rule 23, the tone of the majority
opinion suggests deep skepticism about any claim of discrimination not founded in demonstrable
animus. In denying class certification, the Court in effect rejected the plaintiff’s theory that WalMart’s organizational structures systematically disadvantaged women because of its failure to establish
any criteria for pay and promotion decision, or to post available management jobs. If the Court were to
move substantive doctrine toward requiring proof of specific discriminatory intent by a culpable actor,
that would weaken the ability of the EEOC to push even the standardizing bureaucratic responses we
document.
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